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It should be understood that the purpose of today's 
hearing is not to resolve the issue, but only to provide selected 
witnesses with a forum to express t ir individual opinions on the 
state of the law. 
We know that there will be many attempts to bring bills 
before the Legislature to take away the right to strike for public 
sector employees. 
The Committee is aware that there are numerous points of 
views relative to the legality of public sector strikes. The staff 
has tried to devise an agenda to reflect, in part, these diverse 
views, although not all public sector interest groups or viewpoints 
will be presented today. 
Before we begin, I would li to state that those indi-
viduals who may feel, after the end of the session, that they want 
to come forward and say a few words, time permitting, we will 
allow that. 
I would like to introduce some of the people up here. Mr. 
Jim Bald lS the Minority Consultant, Jim is to my far right, philo-
sophically and in reality. Vern Oliver, Deputy Legislative Counsel 
is here and is going to give us his views on various and sundry 
things. Robbin Lewis-Coaxum, the Consultant to the Committee. The 
Senior Consultant is the gentleman with the receding hairline to my 
far left, Mr. Dave Cox. This is Teri Hanna, my Secretary. 
The first person we're going to ask to come up is Bonnie 
Bogue, Assistant Director, California Public Employee Relations Pro-
gram from Berkeley. I would like very much to ask you to speak right 
into the mike because the proceedings are being taped this morning. 
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But generally speaking, most employers experience just one strike 
and that's it, so far. 
To put California's strike experience in perspective, it 
might be helpful to look at statistics of public sector strikes in 
other major, industrial states. I have available comparative fig-
ures for the years 1972-1980. In that 9-year period, California 
had 352, compared to 506 in Michigan, 179 in New York. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: I have a question. Those states out-
side the State of California, you say they had no strike legislation 
passed through their houses? 
MISS BOGUE: There is a great variety of legislation a-
mongst the various states. The 3 states for which I was able to 
gather comparative statistics, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania, 
had a variety of legislation. Now Michigan, which had 506 strikes, 
as I recall has no strike legislation, but not particular penalties 
attached to striking. It just says strikes are unlawful. New York 
has that, although they have specific penalties for those who strike. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: How many strikes would you say? 
MISS BOGUE: Michigan had 506, New York had 179, 
Pennsylvania had 702 and California had 352 in that comparative 
time frame. Pennsylvania has a provision that legalizes some 
strikes and not others. All 3 have binding arbitration for safety 
services as an alternative to strike. 
I don't have exhaustive statistics for other states. If 
it would be helpful, I might be able to gather them for you. 
They're provided through the BLS in various publications and we 
were able, yesterday, to drag out 3 as a comparison. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: 
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MISS BOGUE: No, firefighters, that particular statute 
refers only to firefighters, it does not refer to police agencies. 
And the statistics that I've given you in the tables lump fire-
fighters and police officers together. There are strikes by 
firefighters. In my experience I don't think that it's had much 
affect. I think that there are other reasons for firefighters 
striking and the existence of that statute has not had, in my 
experience, a particular affect on whether they occur or what 
happens if they do. But statistically, I don't have any infor-
mation for you. 
The common law, in the United States, it has been 
generally held that public employees do not have the right to 
collectively bargain or to strike unless they've been authorized 
to do so by a legislative enactment. 
In 1969, the State Court of Appeal adopted that prin-
ciple for California local government employees in the case 
Almond vs. County of Sacramento. That holding has been reaf-
firmed in several subsequent appellate court rulings. Only one 
category of public employees in the state has been granted the 
right to strike -- the State Supreme Court in 1960 found that 
the language contained in the Los Angeles transit district's 
enabling statute implicitly granted the right to strike. As a 
result, a few other transit districts with similar labor relations 
provisions have assumed that their employees also enjoy the legal 
right to strike. 
Until 1979, the State Supreme Court did not speak 
against the right to strike question, so that the prevailing law 
• 
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The difference is -- what kind of deterrent does the 
law provide against so-called ill al strikes? What kind of 
sanctions can be imposed on those strike? That is, how is 
the law enforced and to what effect? 
Since there is no state legislative prohibition of 
strikes, there are no statutory penalties for striking. The 
enforcement mechanism that has been available is the strike 
injunction. In 1972 I conducted a study of several so-called 
"illegal" strikes to determine the effect that the law had on 
the conduct of those strikes. At that time I concluded, and I 
quote: 
"Public employee strikes are a fact of life in 
California. The law declaring them illegal does 
not prevent their occurrence not even halt those 
that occur." 
I found that this was true because the enforcement 
mechanism, the injunction, was in the hands of the employer which 
might or might not decide to invoke it. Those that did decide to 
get an injunction found that it was generally ineffective 1n 
halting a strike, and that it was difficult and costly to enforce 
an injunction through contempt of court proceedings. 
In the subsequent years I have found no reason to change 
this conclusion. Some employers still seek injunctions, and some 
attempt to enforce the orders by seeking court penalties against 
unions and strikers, but generally with little success. Even 
those that initiate legal action may drop it as part of the nego-
tiated settlement of the strike. Courts still will, for the most 
• 
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the ground that the empl r 
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relations systems. 
For example, rec 
cities have adopted ordinance 
be fired and not rehired at al 
with loss of accrued benefits 
merely invoke a civil service 
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certain number of days is deemed to have quit his job and, accord-
ingly, terminate strikers for be AWOL. (That option has already 
become more visible with the air traffic controllers strike, I might 
add) 
Some local employers have revoked recognition of the 
striking union, either because the local employee relations ordi-
nance calls for that as a strike sanction or merely because the 
employer determines that the union no longer represents a majority 
of the employees since the newly hired employees do not belong to 
the union. A test case on that issue, IBEW vs. Gridley, is now 
before the State Supreme Court. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: On that point, how is it possible to 
say that an employee no longer belongs to the union when he has 
paid his current dues? 
MISS BOGUE: No, it's not a question of that. If the 
strikers have been replaced by new employees who actually do not 
belong to the union, then they can argue that this employee 
organization no longer represents a majority of the employees 
within that bargaining unit or that are employed by that employer 
and, therefore, they are under no obligation to recognize that 
union as a majority representat e of the employees. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Through the strike they have decerti-
fied themselves? 
MISS BOGUE: In effect, that's what some employers have 
asserted. Or others have a provision their own rules and 
regulations governing employee relations that declares that once 
a union strikes, it has lost its right to be certified. There 
I 
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I think its only happened 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: 
tarily continue to contr 
MISS BOGUE: Then 
certified again and then 
the union does, in fact, sti 1 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: t 
members of that organization 
MISS BOGUE: They can 
them being members, it's just 
tinue to recognize the un 
over the strike issues. If t 
no longer represent these 
it has no obligation to barga 
Issues that are in dispute 
out there representing its 1 
Another alternative 1 
union and/or employees. Sever 
only one has reached a fin J 
Local 660 has a damage j ent 
Angeles County Sanitation Distr 
dollars, plus interest. That e 
eventually reach the Supreme C t. 
right to strike for local gove 
whether the union can lawfull 
added expenses incurred because of s 
f 
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Other states -- and I will not get into the variety of 
legislation that they have -- but o 
statutory penalties, such as f es 
or against the unions, or dock 
day they're out on strike. 
states have tried different 
st the striking employees 
es 2 days pay for each 
Such alternatives have had little or no use in California. 
Most public employers who experience a strike see it as a problem 
to be resolved at the bargaining table with a representative of 
its employees. Many that I have interviewed over the years find 
that legal sanctions, even when available, do not deter strikes, 
and more importantly, do not reso e the underlying dispute that 
has brought on the strike. I have been told that a resort to legal 
sanctions can actually prolong a str because it distracts the 
parties from the immediate problem of bargaining on the merits of 
the impasse, and can create addition oblems that stand in the 
way of settlement such as, a demand for amnesty for strikers. 
Although a strike injunction may weaken the resolve of strikers 
to stay out, and that, of course, has happened. It can also have 
the opposite effect of strengthening the individual's resolve 
under the threat of martyrdom. 
I have no conclusions to draw or to offer to the 
Committee, but merely these remarks as an overview of the public 
employee strikes in California ga ed from several years of docu-
menting and observing them. And I thank you for the opportunity 
to speak to you today. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Miss Bogue, we certainly appreciate 
your coming to testify. Mr. Bald has a question for you. Any 
• 
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members of the Committee can ask 
desire. Mr. Bald. 
15 
CONSULTANT, JIM BALD: 
since the PERB has been given orig 
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have had any impact? 
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instance, so far this year there 
pared to 76 in 1979. So there has 
so prevalent statewide that it's not 
MR. BALD: In talking o 
the field these last couple of year 
s 
s you noted any or heard of any 
that decision might do for stri 
Acts? Is there any speculation t t e 
PERB's original jurisdiction over st 
as well? 
MISS BOGUE: I would s 
court found for granting PERB itia 
would probably pertain to the ot r 
was based on the principle that RB 
over unfair practice charges, 
be given the opportunity to determ e 
be an unfair practice. And then, if 
0 
l 
then it can go ahead with 
under the act. If 's not 
are left to their own i e 
wering your question, I 
one way or the other, but I 
same reasoning would perta 
ev 
MR. BALD: Thank 
that I find your publication 
MISS BOGUE: Well, t 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Mr. 
CONSULTANT, DAVE 
to effectively legislate a 
to specifically authorize enti 
legal action against the strik 
occurred as a result of the str 
relative to that philosophy? 
MISS BOGUE: As to 
received services? An ind 
effective mechanism? 
MR. COX: Right. 
t 
MISS BOGUE: Well, I 
would say that it would be 1 e 
it would be effective. I th t 
go into why any particular gr 
ticular time that would be ano 
occurrence, but I have no e 
whether or not that would be an 
a 
0 
on it deems as appropriate 
t e, then the parties 
ts. In directly ans-
s 
ation about that 
enera ly assumed that the 
e s just in passing 
ve valuable. 
much. 
sa 
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stion, Miss Bogue. 
that the only way 
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any damages that 
have any thought 
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CHAIRMAN TUCKER: 
CONSULTANT, ROBB s 
you found that there has b e 
activity due to the pass e 
to say, throughout the Unit 
MISS BOGUE: I wish 
Through a quick glance of t e 
• 
mine that. I think you can 
provision and note that even 
still having some strikes. So 1 
But I did not have available 
an anti-strike provision bee 
off of strikes. 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: t 
of penalties do they have? 
MISS BOGUE: In 
vision for docking employees l 
instead of just losing that 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: 
MISS BOGUE: Which j 
you're subject to being term 
there have been some local s l 
that requires that employees 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: ? 
or are they granted .... 
MISS BOGUE: It has n 
one instance in San Diego, I b 
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maybe, where employees, there was 
and there was a strike and they at 
employees because there were te 
and they got hung up on the 
right and the terminations were 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: Do 
a provision on the books 
ted to terminate the 
laws in the procedure 
hadn't been handled 
gest that if the Legis-
lature would enact no-strike legislation that they recommend 
some type of penalty or enforcement policy to go along with 
that statute? 
MISS BOGUE: I would not make a recommendation one way 
or the other. I think that all I can do is indicate that there 
are those alternatives available they are used in some 
places. But I have no recommen tion to make one way or the 
other. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Thank 
Reginald Alleyne has arrived. 
California, Los Angeles. Professor 
you, we're glad you got out of Los 
very much. Well, Professor 
1 of Law, University of 
leyne we were waiting for 
eles. 
PROFESSOR REGINALD Well, I'm glad, too. Good 
morning and thank you very much for iting me. The last time I 
appeared before this Committee it s one of my more enjoyable 
public experiences. I found the Committee to be expert on the 
questions asked, very challenging and it was just a great overall 
experience. So I was delighted to get the invitation to appear 
once more. In fact, the plane that was on, because of the wind 
the pilot said, took a route over t City of San Francisco and 
then turned back and made a Northward approach on the runway and 
we passed right over this hotel if I had a parachute, 
I would have jumped out of pl to get re on time, but 
I didn't have a parachute. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: r your remarks and we 
agree when you said that we wer 11 informed Committee, it 
is because we have such people as Miss Bogue and the 
rest of the professionals who are go to testify this morning. 
Thank you, sir. 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: re ite welcome. I have only 
one misgiving about accepting invitation of the Committee 
and that's because it invo a plane ride and, although I 
enjoy flying ordinarily, I persona not believe that flying 
is as safe as it used to be before ,000 air traffic controller's 
went on strike and were fired as a result. And although the 
National Transportation Safe B 
saying that flying is safe rig 
flights, they qualify that find 
has issued a report 
now with the reduced level of 
strongly suggesting 
in fact, indicating that things are very tense and as the 
weather gets bad and there is more stra on the current crew 
of controller's, that we m wel erience a disaster as 
the effort to rebuild the a traf control system does not 
succeed. 
I opened my remarks s that because I believe 
that the manner in which President Re an has treated the 
"PATCO" strike and the adverse eff ts on the economy and the 
risks to those of us who travel a r have a direct bearing 
on the subject you've asked me to speak on this morning. The 
0 ~ 
subject of this hearing is the 1 al status of public employee 
strikes in California. 
What I would first like to 
decisions, mainly one, the one cis 
key decision in attempting to as erta 
1s address the court 
which in my mind is the 
what the legal status of 
strikes for public employees is in California and then to discuss 
the President's treatment of the PATCO strike and tie those two 
topics together and attempt to po t out to the Committee just 
how they are related and why, view as I indicated to the 
Committee during my last appearanc , any attempts by a State 
Legislature or a City Council or Bo s of Supervisors or the 
Federal Government, for that matter, to make public employee 
strikes illegal will continue to be counter productive. That's 
a hard argument to sell to the general public because the public 
is of a view and understandab so, t t if there is a social 
evil, you make it illegal. The pub c does not understand the 
view that even though a strike is a very undesirable event and 
that we might call it a necessary evil ~~ or evil nonetheless --
that the way to keep strikes to a m 1mum, not only in a private 
sector but in the public sector is to make strikes lawful so that 
both parties at the bargaining t le have a clear understanding 
that if the bargaining process does not result in a collective 
bargaining agreement being reached t t there very likely would 
be a strike and if there is a stri that both parties or one 
of the two parties would be ser s injured as a result and 
with that knowledge, as we see from the experience in the private 
sector both parties knowing of those dire consequences -- that if 
• 
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a strike is going to take place both parties will work very hard 
to avoid a strike. In addition, we know from the statistics that 
in 99 and 9 tenths of the cases in the private sector they succeed 
and they reach an agreement. This has been the underlying objec-
tive of the National Labor Relations Act ever since 1935 and we 
have to wonder when the lesson of that statute will be brought 
home to the public sector. 
Let me turn to what I suggest is the leading California 
Supreme Court decision on the subject of public employee strikes 
and more particularly on the subject of where we are in terms of 
the legal status of public employee strikes in California. It's 
not easy to determine what that status is in California because 
unlike other states we do not have, as all of you know, a clear 
legislative mandate that public employee strikes are unlawful 
or that they are, for that matter lawful. And what we have is 
a series of court decisions on the subject, a sort of common 
law on strikes. And since the court is fashioning these deci-
sions and this common law on a case-by-case basis, it's a little 
hard to generalize and say exactly what the level status is. 
But if I had to turn to one case I would look at San 
Diego Teachers vs. the Superior Court which was decided by the 
California Supreme Court in April of 1979 and is reported that 
24 California Reporter third at page 1 and also at 154 California 
Reporter at page 893. I can summarize the holding in that case 
before briefly describing the facts which led to that case 
reaching the California Supreme Court. The facts are very 
simple -- there was a strike by school teachers in San Diego. 
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Those teachers were represented by the San Diego Teachers Asso-
ciation. Both during and before the strike unfair practice 
charges were filed with the Public Employment Relations Board. 
The Teachers Association accused the school district of a re-
fusal to bargain and the school district accused the teachers 
of refusing to bargain in that they had taken part in a strike. 
While the strike was at the threatened strike stage, the school 
districts sought an injunction from a Superior Court Judge. He 
granted the injunction, given the fact that the leader of the 
San Diego Teachers Association had indicated that there would 
be a strike, and he was right. Subsequently, there was a strike 
in the face of the injunction so that given the normal reaction 
of judges when they issue injunctions, an individual's disobeyed 
them, the Superior Court judge, Judge Levette, issued a contempt 
citation against the leader of the San Diego Teachers Association. 
He was found guilty of contempt of court, fined and given a jail 
sentence. He never served that sentence because the union, of 
course, appealed his contempt conviction to the California 
Supreme Court. 
The California Supreme Court, in a split decision, 
held that the contempt citation was improperly issued. That 
before seeking an injunction the school district (San Diego 
School District) should have been obligated to go to the Public 
Employment Relations Board and to ask of the Board to find an 
unfair practice on the part of the union (Teachers Association) 
and to find further that as a result of the unfair practice of 
refusing to bargain and going on strike without exhausting the 
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impasse procedures available under the Educational Employment 
Relations Act, that the General Counsel of the PERB should have 
made a recommendation to PERB and PERB should have decided 
whether or not that unfair practice should be cured by -- among 
other things -- PERB seeking an injunction. In short, the 
court held that the contempt conviction was invalid because 
instead of going to the PERB, the school district went straight 
to the Superior Court. 
Now the interesting thing about San Diego Teachers 
Association vs. Superior Court is that the California Supreme 
Court said in that case that, and I quote, 
''It is unnecessary here to resolve the question of 
the legality of public employee strikes if the in-
junction remedies were improper because of the 
districts failure to resolve its administrative 
remedies under the EERA." 
In other words, by going to the Public Employment 
Relations Board and asking the Board to seek an injunction. 
Well, having found that the school district should have exhausted 
its administrative remedies before the Public Employment Relations 
Board, the court had to stand by its statement that it was 
unnecessary to resolve the question of the legality of public 
employee strikes. And yet, in my view, it was impossible to reach 
the holding that the Supreme Court did on the question of whether 
the contempt order by the judge was a valid one. Without deciding, 
in part, the question of whether or not public employee strikes --
at least some of them, in California, might be lawful. 
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Let me explain briefly why I see that dilemma in the 
opinion of the court. The court concludes, and again I quote 
from the opinion, 
"It does not follow from the dis tion attendant on 
a teacher's strike that immediate injunctive relief 
and subsequent punishment for contempt are typically 
the most effective means of minimizing the number of 
teaching days lost from work stoppages. As observed 
in City and County of San Francisco vs. Cooper, the 
question of appropriate sanctions for illegal strike 
activity is complex, harsh, automatic sanctions, often 
do not prevent strikes and are counter-productive." 
That is at page 11 of the court's opinion. 
And I'm following up on that important statement. At 
page 13 the court said, 
"The mission of PERB is to foster a constructive em-
ployment relations. That mission, surely, includes 
the long-range minimization of work stoppages. 
"PERB may conclude, in a particular case, that a 
restraining order or an injunction would not hasten 
the end of a strike (as perhaps neither did here) 
and on the contrary, would impair the success of 
the statutory mandated negotiations between union 
and employer. A court enjoining a strike on the 
basis of a rule that public employee strikes are 
illegal and harm resulting from the withholding 
of teachers services cannot with expertise tailor 
• 
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its remedy to implement the broader objectives 
entrusted to PERB." 
Now, as I read those two portions of a courts opinion, 
court is say that in some circumstances a public employee 
strike should be oined and in other circumstances a public em-
ployee strike should not be enjoined and it is up to the Public 
Employment Relations Board, on a case-by-case basis, to make a 
determ of circumstances might g rise to PERB not 
seeking an injunction against a strike and letting that strike run 
its course. Unfortunately, in the typical way of courts, the de-
cision does not say what the circumstances are under which PERB 
should seek the injunction to stop the strike and does not say 
under what circumstances PERB should not seek an injunction and 
what circumstances it should stop the strike by seeking an injunc-
tion in the courts. That's left open to future cases. But that's 
not terribly important. What is important, and it bears repeating, 
is that from these two statements, the court has left open the door 
of the Public Employment Relations Board to find that in a particu-
lar case the Board should not try to stop a strike by seeking an 
injunction. And if the courts are saying that in some instances no 
injunction should be sought to stop a strike, the courts, the 
California Supreme Court is necessarily holding that in some cir-
cumstances a strike is a valid and lawful strike. And the underlying 
premise that I read in these two portions of the opinion which I 
read to you is that it's simply futile, in some cases, counter-
productive in others, to seek an injunction which has the effect 
of stopping a strike -- or attempts to stop a strike. 
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Now the court didn't say that, but I'm of the opinion as 
recognizing two things which I think are important and tend to be 
lost on the public. One is that there is something about the tend-
ency of individuals to withhold their services from employers which 
makes it very much akin to the old prohibition laws. Which the laws 
were simply incapable of enforcing. Members of the California 
Supreme Court, in my view, recognized that many injunctions issued 
by Superior Courts will simply not be obeyed. That the individual 
who is cited for contempt, who is jailed, as a result, and we have 
evidence and experience along these lines in other jurisdictions, 
will simply be looked upon as martyrs for a cause. The jail time 
will be served, the fine will be paid and the union will continue 
to strike in the face of the injunction. 
Judges do not like to give the appearance that they are 
impotent and that their orders can be slighted. And I think that's 
one of the underlying reasons for the courts pronouncement. That 
in some cases it may be to the best interest of all that the strike 
not be enjoined. 
I think, implicit in the decision 1s the courts recog-
nition that even if an injunction is obeyed in some instances, 
there will be more instances in which it will not be obeyed, but 
it is a punishment attempted to be meted out by an employer in-
creases the threat of a general strike. That is a strike by other 
employees in support of the original strikers. And in opposition 
to punishment meted out to the original strikers could be a real 
eventuality. That is how I view the decision 1n the San Diego 
Teachers Association vs. Superior Court. 
I 
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Implementing that decision, just to touch briefly upon 
one PERB decision, the Modesto School District Case, PERB refused 
to seek an injunction even though the impasse procedures of the 
ational Employment Relations Act been exhausted there was 
one dissenting decision in the case, then board member Gonzales 
said that the was legislatively authorizing strikes. I think 
that was a decidedly incorrect view. What the PERB did in the 
Modesto case was to implement the langu e that they found and 
interpret it accurately, in my view, in San Diego Teachers Associ-
ation vs. Superior Court authorizing the PERB not to seek an 
injunction in particular cases when in the view of the PERB it 
would be counter-productive to do so. 
I would like to turn now to the administrations handling 
of the PATCO strike and use that as an illustration of what the 
California Supreme Court probably had in mind when it recognized 
that it would not be in the best interest of the California 
public to say, by way of judge made common law (as some lower 
courts have done in California) that all public employee strikes 
are illegal under California law. It's true that President 
Reagan may have won a victory over PATCO, but the question 
remains whether the price of victory over the long term will 
prove to be too high. When close to 11,000 traffic controller's 
walked off their job, they did not expect to be decertified, 
they did not expect to be fired, I'm sure they believed that 
the administration would not run the risk of taking a potentially 
crippling strike. PATCO, however, miscalculated its strength 
and the administrations resolve and now with the recent 
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decertification effort, its status as an entity with which the 
administration must bargain is very much in doubt. 
Even if the administration had not completely succeeded 
in resisting PATCO's bargaining demands it's irly clear to me 
and I think to any observer of the collective barga ing scene, 
that the administration would not have given up anything close to 
the five hundred million dollars that PATCO sought and that the 
public viewed as exorbitant. Those of us, including the members 
of your committee who are familiar with the give-and-take of 
collective bargaining, know that the mere fact that PATCO opened 
negotiations with a five hundred million dollar demand probably 
meant PATCO never expected to walk off with that much of a gain. 
What is important here and what ties in with San Diego 
Teachers Association vs. Superior Court, decided by the California 
Supreme Court is that at the core of the administrations unwill-
ingness to bargain with PATCO during the strike. Are the federal 
statutes making public employee strikes by federal employees un-
lawful? It's the illegality of federal employee strikes that 
permitted President Reagan to take the position that he would not 
bargain with a union engaged in an illegal strike. 
Now we ought to consider the effect of the position of 
the administration being allowed to take the position that it 
would not bargain with a union that is on strike. To illustrate 
the point, assume hypothetically that at the time of the PATCO 
strike air traffic controller's had been employed by a private 
sector employer. In that event, the controller's and their 
employer would have been covered by the National Labor Relations 
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Act. The 1935 statute authoriz collective bargaining for 
ivate sector employees and permitting str s by private 
sector empl es. The court have consistently inte reted 
NRLA to me at an empl commits an unfair practice 
breaking o negotiations th the union solely because the 
un is on str in rt its bargain demands. And 
the simple expedient behind that idea is the a of forcing 
parties o otiate while the str is in progress for 
the purpose of furthering the chances of a settlement of the 
underlying dispute, contract dispute which led to the strike. 
To me 's a very sensible primise. The National Labor 
Relations Act also operates on the premise that the mere 
possibility of a strike, as I indicated earlier, with its 
potential for economic hardship for both parties will encourage 
the kinds of serious bargaining that will prevent a strike 
from taking place. 
The serious question for the Committee, and all mem-
bers of the California public, is whether or not these policies, 
hard as they might be to understand by the lay public, which 
are designed by the federal government to decrease private 
sector strike possibilities and to shorten the duration of 
strikes when strikes take place, ought to apply as sensibly 
to the federal and local governments in the capacities as 
employers. And it may well prove to be the incapability of 
those policies to the federal government itself as an employer 
that could make the administrations short term victory over 
PATCO one of mere appearance over the short term. 
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The administration has already all but openly admitted 
that the so-called rebuild of the traffic control system is 
just barely keeping pace wi the demands being made on the 
system. One might po to the President s apparent success 
of handling the PATCO strike, there's some evidence that public 
employers across the nation will now take their cue from the 
President, stiffen the resolve in the face of a threatened 
strike. But that view fails to take into account how tunate 
the President was, in my view. From his perspective, having 
as an adversary in the PATCO strike an organization not close 
to being fully supported by other unions because PATCO's 
history of ignoring other union picket lines and somewhat 
ironically, because of PATCO's support of President Reagan 
during his campaign for the Presidency, the administration 
would have been forced to bargain its way to a solution of the 
PATCO dispute if key unions like the International Association 
of Machinists which represents large numbers of airline 
mechanics -- and the Airline Pilots Association had refused to 
cross PATCO picket lines. Now not every public employer --
including public employers in California -- would be so fortu-
nate to have that kind of a union as an adversary, across the 
bargaining table. But neither is success in confronting a 
union during a strike, some ing unknown in private sector 
labor management relations. And this is a lesson that's sometimes 
forgotten. One of the prevailing myths about strikes is that all 
of them are bound to succeed in defeating an employers bargaining 
objectives. We see that in the dissenting opinion in San Diego 
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Teachers Association vs. Superior Court where Justice Richardson 
quotes Judge Coflin of one of the Appellate Courts in an earlier 
ca e, lding effect, that every t ere's a strike that a 
lie employer is going to have to g But not anything 
close to all private sector strikes are successful in the sense 
t t t union wal away with more substant 1 gains than the 
employers last pre-strike offer. Indeed, it's the uncertainty 
f t str s success and the hardsh of c ckless paydays 
during the strike that so effectively restrain the inclination 
to strike, so much so, that in my view of the laws banning 
public employee strikes are almost irrelevant as supplementary 
deterrents. All we get from them -- the laws banning strikes --
is the example we have seen in the PATCO strike, of the public 
employer being able to take the position that I will not 
negotiate while the strike is in progress. And all that 
does is prolong the strike beyond the duration that would 
have taken place had the employer been compelled to negotiate. 
I have no doubt that if the administration had been operating 
under the same kind of National Labor Relations Act requiring 
bargaining in the face of a strike, that this dispute -- the 
PATCO dispute -- would have been ended by now. It might have 
ended with a victory for the administration. But the Traffic 
Controller's would have been working now, defeated at the 
bargaining table and we would not be seeing the potential 
for chaos in the year that we see now, the long delays in 
flights getting away and the great inconvenience to the 
public. 
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The private sector employer, it should not be forgotten, 
is not entirely unprotected by the law in the face of an economic 
strike. A private sector employer may replace strikers and operate 
the struck establishment with the replacements during the duration 
of a strike. There's no obligation to fire the replacement 
employees when the strike ends and the strikers seek to r a 
their jobs. If vacancies exist after the strike ends, the private 
sector employer in order to avoid violating the National Labor 
Relations Act, need only refrain from refusing to hire former 
strikers because they struck. Now that's a very effective 
counter to the strike. And it was approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in a 1938 case NLRB vs. McKay Radio and Telegraph Co. 
If similar ground rules had been applicable to federal 
sector employees at the time of the PATCO strike, the administra-
tion could have replaced striking air traffic controllers during 
the strike, and rehired them after the strikes end to fill the 
many vacancies for experienced controllers that will now not be 
filled for at least another twenty months while the air traffic 
control system is being rebuilt by amateurs and by beginners. I 
might also add that the fallacy of that whole situation is illus-
trated quite neatly and graphically in my view, by the trial 
balloon announcement that was floated by the President a few days 
ago that he may rehire traffic controllers, but not as traffic 
controllers; they will deliver mail, they will fill as clerks in 
the Internal Revenue Service, on the ground, out of the towers 
while mere chaos takes place overhead. That is a patently 
ridiculous spectacle, and I hope for the sake of our government 
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and the possible embarrassment of our government in the eyes of 
other nations, if not internally and domestically, that that 
scene never takes place t United States. In conjunction 
th the ship of checkless paydays during the strike and the 
always real possibility of ending a long strike with little more 
gain the employer's last pre-strike offer, the ability to 
replace strikers and offer the replacements permanent jobs con 
tributes to the low strike rate of public, rivate sector employees 
in the United States. I might add, in conclusion, that it might 
be argued that public employees perform a unique service and may 
not be as replaceable as private sector employees, I'm sure you'll 
hear that today. But that generalization sweeps too far and too 
wide. It's a rehashing of the old and, in my view, irrational 
notion that all public employees, including all air traffic con-
trollers, are more essential than all private sector employees, 
including all commercial airline pilots. Now the fallacy there 
is underscored by the administration's insistence that air traffic 
controllers are replaceable; thus, even if the administration is 
successful in rebuilding the air traffic control system slowly 
but without major incident, one of the prevailing assumptions 
about public employee strikes, irreplaceability of public employees, 
will have been undercut. The question will then be whether the 
risk of disaster over the long-term of almost two years had been 
worth taking. On the other hand, the strains placed on the air 
traffic system by the need to rebuild it becomes a contributing 
cause of a serious disaster, the wisdom of the laws permitting 
the refusal to negotiate while a strike takes place will 
- 34 -
graphically have become open to serious question. My final sen-
tence is this -- that I believe those are some of the unde ying 
concerns, or were some of the underlying concerns, of the 
California Supreme Court in its decision in San Diego Teachers 
vs. Supreme Court. Thank you very much, again, for the opportuni 
to be here. If this committee has questions, I'll answer them. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Go right ahead, Mr. Bald. 
MR. BALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to pursue 
two lines of questioning with you, Professor. First, on the sub-
ject of the Supreme Court's San Diego decision, and I concur 
and agree with you that it certainly is a key position. 
The question of the legality or illegality of public employees' 
strikes here in California has been with us actively now for 8 or 
10 years, certainly since the passage of the Rodda Act; and up 
until the San Diego decision, it was accepted generally that pub-
lic employee strikes were illegal because of the lower court 
decision. Do you -- and the Legislature in all that time declined 
to come down on one side or the other; it left an open question. 
Do you perceive the court's decision in the San Diego case as 
finally saying, "If the Legislature is not going to make a decision, 
we are going to move in other directions. And we are going to say 
that in certain instances, public employee strikes may well be legal"? 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: I think it's not a question of moving 
ln that direction, but you've put it quite succinctly. I think that 
is precisely where we are now with the San Diego Teachers Association. 
MR. BALD: Do you think that is a result of the Legislators' 
indecision in this area? 
• 
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PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: Well, I think it is a consequence of 
there being no legislation on the subject for public employees in 
California. Yes, you might say that we might look at it in terms 
of the court filling a void. On the ot hand, I'm not sure how 
the members of the California Supreme Court feel about the wisdom 
of legislation being enacted. I know that's none of their business, 
and that's entirely up to the Legislature, but they may agree with 
me that the issue is so complicated and so laden with emotion that 
the best way to handle it is on a case-by-case development of the 
common law. I would also add that one thing that to me explains 
why the Legislature has done virtually nothing in this area since 
public employees are authorized to engage in public bargaining 
while the court is moving ahead is explained on the basis of the 
differing nature of the Legislature and the judiciary. You, as 
Legislators, are more -- by nature -- sensitive to the will of 
the electorate than the court must be. As I indicated in my 
opening remarks, it would be very hard to explain if I were a 
legislator to my constituents, why you legalize something in 
order to keep it from happening as often as it would happen 
otherwise. It's a very hard argument to sell; and I am quite 
sure that there are people who represent a district where it 
would be impossible to sell it and where, if you took that view, 
you'd be defeated. The court, on the other hand, is -- as all 
of us know -- more insulated from those kinds of political 
pressures since its operating here on a case-by-case basis. 
Its judgments are not nearly as dramatic as would be the action 
of the Legislature in the naked, bald statement of a statute that 
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would be debated for several weeks, days, be were enacted; 
and, so I conclude that it is eas r for t 
because it is easier for the court and i 
court to 
to operate the way it has than it 
attempt to fill the void of becoming embroil 
t court 
Legislature to 
public debate 
of whether legislation should ban strikes or ther legislation 
should make public employee strikes lawful. 
MR. BALD: Thank you. I t it -- let me see if I can 
restate your position -- there is no instance which you would 
see public employees' strikes as being illegal. It is your posi-
tion that public employee strikes are and ought to be legal and 
permissible. Have I stated your case? 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: That is -- we cannot say that that 
~s yet the view of the California Supreme Court. But you're asking 
me my personal view? My personal view is that public employees' 
strikes across the board should be lawful. 
MR. BALD: And you say, as your view, there is no 
difference between employer-employee relat s the private 
sector and the public sector, or at least ere 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: That is my view. 
MR. BALD: You can think, then, of no 
stance in which a public employee stri is 
shouldn't be? 
thetical In-
ate ought to be 
stopped by court order or force of arms, if necessary? 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: A violent str ? Yes. 
MR BALD: Well, a violent strike would be impermissible. 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: Would be impermissible? If you're 
asking whether any peaceful strike, economic strike in support of 
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a case while I was a visiting professor back East for a year in 
the Medford, Massachusetts School District in which, at one point, 
I went back to the school district, and I said to them, "I can't 
get the teachers' association to move one iota from its demands." 
And every member of the school board virtually stood up and cheered. 
They said, "Great! Now there will be a strike, and we have the 
replacements available, substitute teachers, to replace those 
strikers; and we will call up those replacements; bring them in, 
and simply go on running the schools with the substitute teachers." 
They said to me, "There is no way these people can win a strike. 
We will get rid of them. We're glad they're going on strike," and 
they meant it. They really meant it, first of all. And I went 
back to the union and I said they were caucusing. It was not one 
of those situations where the parties could confront each other, 
that happens sometimes like some bad marriages. I went back to 
the union, and I said, "Look!" and reiterated what the school 
board had said. And so, they were so concerned that they took a 
recess for 3 weeks, it was close to Christmas we came back in 
January, and the union said that it would not go on strike; that 
it was going to accept the employer's last offer. That happens 
as frequently, more frequently, than your very dramatic, hypothet-
ical school board closing its schools on an open-ended basis 
because it doesn't have the money to meet a union's demands. I 
think implicit in your question is the underlying notion which I 
addressed in my opening remarks, that anytime a union goes on 
strike, the union is going to win; when the truth of the matter 
is that, even in the private sector where it's easier for a union 
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there is an over reaction by management; none of us likes to give 
up prerogatives that allowed me to operate unilaterally for all of 
the time I had been iness. But study after s shows quite 
clearly that the greater the experience, the longer the term that 
is, of operating under a collective bargaining statute, the less 
concern there is about the giving up of managerial prerogatives. 
I guess it's like anything else, you want to cling to it when you 
have it, but once you give it up, you get used to having given it 
up. So, yes, my answer to your question would be yes. I have 
already noted a decrease in that attitude as compared with, say, 
early 1976 when the Rodda Act was enacted and during its first 
year of operation. I think school districts are becoming more 
and more accustomed to not dealing unilaterally with employees, 
and they are becoming more accustomed to sharing with employees 
through their employee organizations the decisions on what the 
work environment will be. That's what collective bargaining is. 
MR. BALD: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Well, Professor Alleyne, I can't be 
partial in this hearing, of course, as the Chairman, but I share 
some of your views so far as those controllers. I drove from Los 
Angeles to Sacramento every week for 2 months. After that, I 
decided I'd learn to pray a lot, and I do; I start my pr rs the 
moment that engine starts up on the plane, and I pray t it is 
going to land. You have a question? Okay, Mrs. Coaxum. 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: Yes, could you address any differences 
which may exist between strikes by safety employees compared to strikes 
by other employees? Are there any major differences? 
• 
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PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: Strikes by public safety employees 
as compared with .... 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: Say, clerical. 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: Clerical and all other public em-
ployees whose jobs might be viewed as less essential than the jobs 
of the public safety people. I would not treat them any differently, 
as I indicated in responding to Mr. Bald's question. I think the 
legalizing of public employee strikes should be across the board . 
Obviously, in the case of police and fire, we run greater risks if 
they strike; and yet, I'm not sure that I'm aware of very many 
experiences in which -- and there haven't been very many, of course 
of police strikes and fire strikes where we had the kinds of disaster 
that one might think would take place if police officers and fire 
personnel should strike. The reason why we haven't had those 
disasters in the few instances in which public safety people have 
struck is that they, too, are capable of being replaced. I would 
feel just as safe, if not more safe, with the National Guard 
patrolling my neighborhood with howitzers and bazookas as I would 
with the sheriff's car driving by once every 3 days, two policemen 
with nightsticks and 45-automatics. 
Again, President Reagan's notion all along is, "I can 
replace air traffic controllers. It's going to take me 2 years 
almost, but I'm going to eventually replace them." Police and 
fire are no exception. There is also this point. I think that 
we find that police and fire personnel are fully aware of the 
differences between their responsibilities to the public and 
those of -- to cite your example -- clerical employees. Maybe 
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clerical employees is a example to use this room this morning. 
For that reason, they are less reluctant to go out on strike than 
are other empl e s s I not treat t di rent 
terms of the effect of law upon them. 
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM: Do you know of any ternat s to 
striking, such as bind arbitration; do you feel that is a good 
alternative? 
PROPES I think b ing arbitr ion is 
worst of all worlds. It's even opposed now by responsible employ-
ers, it's opposed by California -- by the National League of Cities 
and its local affiliates here in California. It is s by 
Mayor Bradley. Ideally, binding arbitration is suppos to serve 
as a substitute for the strike, but what we see now is 
doxical situation of public employers; A) opposing the r 
para-
to 
strike; and B) oppos binding arbitration; and I don't know 
where that leaves you. You just can't have it both If you 
want a good indication of the experience with binding a itration, 
you look at Australia where there is binding arbitration the 
private sector and where the strike rate far exceeds t strike 
rate in the private sector in the United States where we erate 
on this desirable, my view, sort of ee mar t stem we 
just don't force ties to use any k of me al s 
we simply rely on 
bringing about a so 
eat of str as a catal 
to a dispute without a str 
ce 
I read 
a Wall Street Journal article just the other day about relations 
between Australia and an, and one of the Japanese s ssmen 
said, "My pr lem deal w h Australia is that t 1 or 
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situation there is chaotic.'' And I know what he meant. That's 
what happens when you rely upon their party neutrals, and when 
you rely upon individuals not bargaining as seriously as they 
might otherwise bargain if it were not for the presence of 
this crutch, of slipping into this binding arbitration seemingly 
easy way of resolving the dispute. And then when the union 
doesn't like what the binding arbitrator decides, what is to 
prevent the union from striking because it objects to the 
arbitrator's award? I'm convinced that binding arbitration 
just doesn't work. It just doesn't work. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: I want to thank you very much, 
Professor Alleyne. 
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: I'd like to call Professor Charles 
Craver, Martin Luther King, Jr., School of Law, University of 
California at Davis. 
PROFESSOR CHARLES CRAVER: I should like to thank this 
Committee for inviting me to appear here today. I'm a firm 
believer that it is important for those of us who are associated 
with the University to participate beyond the walls of our ivory 
tower, and it is nice to have the opportunity to express my views 
here today. I would like to say a few words at the outset about 
the PATCO situation and then some concerns of a general nature 
pertaining to public sector strikes. 
I think, as my colleague Professor Alleyne so aptly 
pointed out, with the PATCO situation, you had people on both 
sides that grossly misconceived the situation. I think it's very 
clear that t empl 
placed in such a mass 
clear that 
loyalty among t 
that's a common error 
public employees in 
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is made by employers general and 
ticular. There is a feel 
comes to a choice between your fellow worker and 
en it 
and 
your employer, 1 e will automat cal w 
their employer who p s their salary. It simply isn't true in 
many cases. 
the ate I could also 
sector either under 
int out that even were PATCO 
National Labor Relations 80-d cooling off 
provision or under the Railway Act 60-day period which covers 
railroad employees and airline employees, most likely President 
would have sought an junction on the basis t a ational 
emergency dispute was lved. 
Secondly, I should point out that e not been a 
national strike of t caliber, even in the pr e sector, for 
two decades, particular the rail and transportation industry 
in general. In 1963 and, if I recall, again in 1967 t ited 
States Congress pass specific legislation resolv at 
was crudely call d ia t to final i ' to use r Sen a tor 
Wayne Morse's term 
several issues 
h was a subst 
arose the railro 
b 
indus 
itration, 
e it was 
clear they were not will to tolerate a national rail strike. 
So, it isn't entirely clear what wou occurr even if 
PATCO were ate sector. 
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A few words about public sector strikes: It is quite 
clear today that it is permissible to prohibit public sector 
strikes; the Supreme Court seemed to accept that position by 
confirming a decision of the District Court in the District of 
Columbia United Federation of Postal Clerks vs. Blount in 1971. 
I do not propose to proselytize either in favor of or opposed to 
public sector strikes. 
I think it is crucial to have a clear definition of 
what it is that is being proscribed. Obviously, we envision a 
concerted refusal to work at all, but often we have to cover such 
things as slow-down. What happens if people assiduously work 
to rule, such as is happening in some areas of this country at 
the present time when police officers write a ticket for every 
conceivable violation, including -- in some cases the City 
Commissioner and the Mayor, would that constitute a work stoppage? 
What happens if teachers refuse to participate in PTA meetings 
that were scheduled in the evening? 
What happens if teachers refuse to accept extra cur-
ricular assignments? My wife is a school librarian, and on 
several occasions they have actually put pressure on employees 
to agree to participate in extra curricular activities where 
the teacher did not wish to do so. Would that constitute an 
illegal work stoppage if strikes were prohibited? No matter 
what is done by the Legislature in this regard, I do think it 
will be necessary for the courts to become involved. They 
obviously have the ultimate decision to interpret and apply the 
law as was done in the San Diego Teachers case, the Supreme Court 
in this State rec 
Alleyne pointed out, t 
ile others m 
prohibited work st 
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ized, I licitly, as Pr essor 
some work stoppages are enjoinable 
e. State of M an ci ally 
es public 1 es, as 
states; and yet, under the Holland School District decision the 
State of Michigan, the State Supreme Court has said une ivocally 
that under certa c cumstances, if a public empl e stri has 
been provoked, be a de se to the labor un 
I will come back to that particular area. 
The issue that was raised at the end of the pr or e-
sentation was that there should be a distinction awn tween 
essential people and non-essential people. One, is o en 
very difficult to ascertain who is essential and who is not 
essential. During the recent debacle in Washington where we 
were having a fiscal crisis where they could not 
budget, I know many people who were very disappo 
were informed that they could go home on the Mond 
ree 
as not being essential. There were no reports where Vice 
a new 
they 
stion 
President Bush was ing that period. So, it is often di icult 
to draw the line. e can often say police and fire ers, 
yet in some areas I forget t city in Arizona re they 
e a sub-contract arr ement wi a pr ate camp to provi 
firefighting services. It is conce le t at 
the end of an reement would have the r to e a 
stoppage as not be public employees. We talk out g e 
collectors and transit personnel, and often they are con ered 
to be essential. yet many areas of t count re 
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such services are provided by private sector employees, they are, 
indeed, entitled to strike under the National Labor Relations Act. 
I that an argument can clearly be made if one is going to 
h it strikes at all that it is far more logical to do so with 
respect to people who are performing "essential" services 
however that is determined -- although I would not want to be the 
person who would have to decide who was essential and who was not. 
With respect to non-essential personnel in the public 
sector, the evidence in many states of this country indicates 
that the legality of strikes in that area is not necessarily going 
to be devastating; states like Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Montana, and 
others have legalized some strikes by non-essential personnel. 
And as Professor Alleyne has pointed out, what often happens is 
that where you know that the employees have the right to strike, 
you have a substantial impetus to bargain in good faith; whereas, 
when you are laboring under the misconception that they cannot 
strike simply because it is illegal, even it is not necessarily 
something that they will not engage in, often the employers do 
not bargain in good faith. I have seen public employers that 
have said, "I explained our position to the workers, and we know 
what's best for them because we know what the budgetary figures 
are, and they should accept that." It is a terribly paternalistic 
view that is often very antagonistic to the employees. 
I remember the situation that existed in Michigan now 
about a decade ago, in fact a little more than that, when my wife 
participated in a rather lengthy teachers' strike, and I can 
remember a public meeting where the union officials and the school 
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f s were presenting their various positions to the 
en 
easurer for the School Board stood up and said 
accountant 
ere is no 
e demand 
s many years, and I have 
we can agree upon 
In fact, he was so graphic 
sa , "If anybody can demonstrate that there is 
ing available, I will immediately resign my 
d have a stoppage, only way it 
settled was because a judge in a show-cause hearing literally 
parties in chambers for 2 days and 2 nights saying 
s commenced on a Thursday and ran all evening into Friday, 
was settl very early Saturday morning because the judge 
tickets to the football game that Saturday, and 
't plan to miss it. And the parties settled, and they 
tl for more than the Treasurer said was in the budget, 
paid it, and they had no difficulty doing so. And so, 
no wonder that teachers are suspicious when one side says 
t only knowledge available. 
I do think that if the Legislature were to prohibit 
, and if they were to determine that certain strikes would 
able, it should provide definitive standards that would 
t court and the Public Employment Relations Board when it 
es ther it would or would not seek an injunction. 
issue was raised earlier whether there can be 
1 c lective bargaining for public employees if they 
not provided either with a strike right or a meaningful 
ernative. I think that if you tell employees that they have 
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no eve e 
no 
11 but we 11 allow to ot ate, t 
1i ants who have o go to t 1r 1 
e es. e no alternat 
become 
beg 
to 
ace 0 d t t to 
ob law. s that should be us 
o not s 
ld not. 
re are several alternat 
s are s , perm tt p s som ich 
a ct-f 
and makes 
wh h they m 
negotiati 
t f 1ng, i l £ten bene£ ial, 
n ral comes ars te of b Sl 
recommendation which not bind on either party, 
consider, and wh h is often a basis for furt r 
re may be b arbitration, and this could 
be one of several varieties. It could be b ing arbitration 
only on non-monetary items, stance, as it is in several 
states. It on be advisory with respect to monetary items 
e 
with the f 
lative b 
1 resolution being le up to the appropriate legis-
e may be binding arbitration of issues whet r 
or not they are monetary or non-monetary. In some states they 
require t neutral to select either the entire final offer of 
employer or entire final offer of the labor organization. 
is has the benefit of at least forcing the parties to achieve 
a reasonable f 1 proposal -- at least it will be rejected in 
arbitration. And I should add, I do share the view of Professor 
leyne in is regard, even though I am an arbitrator, I find 
t vastly preferable to the public as well as the employer and 
workers involved if the parties are able to resolve their own 
disputes. I am not politically accountable, number one, which 
raises substantial questions. I could come in knowing nothing 
s ' 
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about the particular circumstances; and if they fail to educate 
me fully, I could easily make a grievous error. 
I had a case recently in the private sector where the 
obvious solution was one the parties could work out themselves, 
and I could not because I was given two alternatives, neither of 
which was particularly appealing, and I must say -- unlike my 
usual view -- I endeavored strenuously and I plan to continue to 
do so until I have to make a final decision to coax the parties 
back to their bargaining table, in effect, in an effort to achieve 
what to them would be a vastly superior resolution to the one that 
I would be forced to provide should I make the final determination. 
Whenever I have been involved in public sector disputes, I do my 
utmost to convince the parties, even though I have been appointed, 
it ill behooves them to do nothing but prepare for the hearing 
when they could continue bargaining and reach a solution which 
both sides would be able to understand far more than I could. 
The other types of binding arbitration in public sectors, 
some arbitrators are allowed to make determination on an issue-by-
issue basis among the final proposals made by the parties themselves. 
The third real option is one that makes me quite nervous, I must 
say, and that's where the arbitrator has carte blanche authority 
to determine for himself or herself what would be appropriate. 
One of the issues that is most debated is that of the 
ability of the employer to meet the financial obligation being 
specified in the arbitral award, and in the State of Michigan for 
a long time, that was not one of the stated criterion and there 
were several arbitrators' decisions in the City of Detroit where 
• 
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the arbitrator said that's none of his bus ss. In those 
it was not as much of a crisis as it is t , where with stan-
tailly deplet 1 treasury, if I we to come and say to 
a community, "I really don't care r or not you can satisfy 
this without raising taxes," I would very glad that I am not 
subject to the whim of the electorate. On t o r hand, woe 
be it to the legislators who had to carry out cision. There 
s a substantial stion in my mind whet r it is appropriate to 
delegate that authority to a private individual to decide. I am 
a supporter of public sector arbitration, I have written in the 
area and indicated that position, but I must say, that while I 
do support that personally, I think it is entirely appropriate 
to ask the question whether it would be preferable to have the 
public suffer through what in some cases would be at most a short 
work stoppage, then to have somebody come in and recreate, by 
providing deferred compensation, for instance, in the forms of 
generous retirement benefits that will become due in 20 or 30 
years or to provide benefits that would necessitate immediate 
tax increases or service curtailment where it would be better 
if the politically accountable decision were made by those who 
are elected by the public. 
I would like to say a few words about the underlying 
causes of public sector strikes because so often they are ignored. 
It is assumed that it is the aboriginest worker who precipitates 
work stoppages and it simply isn't true in all cases, but that 
is, indeed, the cause of the strike. Someone did raise the 
question earlier about parentalism in the public sector. I think 
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we see in the public sector today, the same phenomenon that 
existed in the late 1930's in the private sector and into the 
1940's. There is substantial reluctance for people who have 
authority to share that authority unnecessarily with other people. 
If I am the manager and I own the company or at least manage the 
company, I do not want my prerogratives infringed by what I perce 
to be subordinate. When one passes a collective bargaining statute, 
that ipso facto makes the employees at least at the bargaining 
table equal to the managers, and they are reluctant to accept 
that and I know many employers both in the public sector and to 
some degree in private sector who feel they know what is best for 
the workers and it is heresy for the workers not to accept the 
assumption. 
In one of the greatest causes of public sector strikes, 
is the employer naively assumes, as I mentioned at the outset, 
that the employees owe their undivided loyalty to management and 
to the government and to the public they serve, rather than to 
their fellow employees in the bargaining unit and to their labor 
organization. In many cases, if they are forced to make a choice, 
workers will select their fellow employees over the public, par-
ticularly if they feel that they are not being treated appropriately. 
Another problem that often arises in the public sector, 
that is not very prevalent in the private sector, is the situation 
where designated bargaining representatives don't really possess 
sufficient authority to resolve the matters, they will ultimately 
have to be decided by the Legislative body, particularly with 
respect to fiscal matters. As a result, the labor union officials 
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avor to achieve an end run by circumventing the designated 
otiators and going directly to friendly Legislators. In this 
, because nothing undercuts a negotiator faster than 
a superior make a decision behind his or her back that 
t are not apprised of. 
Another problem that arises is the area of deferred 
ensation. I was reading the Atlantic article that has been 
news so much lately and they were t king with Mr. Stockman, 
and they said that there is gonna be hell to pay in about 1985 
or 1986. In his response apparently was, that we aren't concerned 
th 1985 or 1986, now we're only talking about the next several 
ars. It's easy to take that view, particularly when ones 
elected for a term of years. As a result, it is very easy to 
placate employees by promising them, as some cities have done, 
much to the chagrin of the current taxpaying public, promising in 
munificient deferred compensation forms of early retirement. 
And as a result, when those retirements which are not fully funded, 
ecome due 20 or 30 years hence, that creates a tremendous crisis 
because they either have to choose between bankruptcy or using 
s that would be available for current services and current 
loyment to pay people who are now working elsewhere and are 
retired. 
Many employers engage in hard bargaining tactics. The 
example Professor Alleyne gave this morning with respect to the 
school board in Massachusetts, some of them really have that 
mentality that this is a win/lose situation. At the bargaining 
le there really can't be a true winner and a true loser, 
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because if one side truly loses, usually both sides lose, since 
its a symbiotic relationship. If the workers are replaced, 
you will have a long period of training, as we see now, as 
we see with respect to PATCO; you will have a work force that 
is often very nervous about the fact that they know the circum-
stances under which they were hired. They are concerned that 
in the future if they are not satisfied with conditions they 
too will be easily replaced, and old addage, that a happy worker 
is a productive worker, holds true whether ones' in the private 
sector or the public sector. If a worker is paranoid about 
his or her future employment, and if they feel that they have 
to succumb to the dictates of their employer no matter how 
fair or unfair, I think the public will have a very dissatisfied 
experience for the work force. It will be very interesting if 
the PATCO situation continues to see what the situation is, not 
only through this winter, as we have far greater problems with 
weather; but, even into next summer with the peak travel, 1n 
the summer time as well as next winter. Because, if they are 
not replaced, to the degree which I think the administration 
still is deluding itself in thinking they will be replaced, 
there is going to be a crisis, I think, in many of the towers 
for people who are working long hours under trying circumstances. 
Another problem that arises in the public sector, is 
the failure of public managers in some cases to handle expedi-
tiously employee grievances. One of the greatest assets provided 
by labor organizations in the collective bargaining process, 
isn't necessary to the increase in benefits, financial in nature, 
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t that we have a structured procedure resolving 
es. I think it is very very helpful to have grievance 
s, I ersonally support, if neces a , where are 
eting a collective b aining contract final binding 
ation. And I must say, when I was the State of Florida, 
was the writing of rules and reg ations for the 
1 loyee Relations Commission in that state, I was happy 
t e State of Florida has it own public employee 
elations statute, a provision requiring in all collective bar-
ga ing agreements, that there be included a provision not only 
grievance resolution, but for final and binding arbitration. 
In this state there is an extreme reluctance of many employers 
to agree to that. We had a recent school board election, in my 
town in Davis, and I was talking to a school board member 
they thought it heresy that they would have to allow an 
outsider to come in and decide whether they had the right to 
discipline or whether they had the right not to evaluate a 
r; or if th had evaluated a teacher to have somebody 
to review the evaluation procedure that had been followed. 
And I should note, many employers sit there and say, 
'I 't know why these workers are so hot headed." We had 
is small grievance and 100 people walked out. I think that 
familiar with labor relations should be aware of the 
t that, where you have seemingly minor grievance, and 
wor rs have elected to go out on strike, it has to be the 
t of the iceberg, and the inquiries must be made to ascertain 
is really troubling the worker. Contrary to the impression 
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of some people in the public, workers do not strike willingly. 
It is a devastating decision, it is a demoralizing decision, one 
is not going to be paid during that period. We do have in general 
such a strong embedded work ethic in our mind, but we don't like 
to be out of work. As a result, it is a very, very difficult 
decision for people, particularly public sector employees, to 
age in a work stoppage. And I think so often when they see 
somebody on strike, whether they are public teachers or safety 
personnel or other people in the publics sphere, and they think 
that they have made that decision lightly, my experience has 
been just the opposite. There are many instances, where perhaps 
a strike would have even been appropriate, where the people 
have elected not to engage in a work stoppage because they felt 
that the conditions simply weren't as outrageous as they felt 
necessary to precipitate as that extreme conduct. 
If public sector strikes are to be unlawful, I think 
the Legislature should make a definitive decision whether they 
feel that this should be done legislatively instead of inferen-
tially. Whether the Public Employment Relations Board should 
make the determinations as to which stoppages are to be prohibited 
and which are to be accepted; whether they should provide 
standards, whether if injunctions are to be sought they should 
be available directly through courts rather than through the 
Public Employment Relations Board initially. A couple of con-
siderations, as I was sitting here listening to people debate 
the necessity for injunctive relief, and a question was asked 
whether any stoppage should be enjoined. If one agrees that 
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some stoppages should be enjoined, it reminded me of the book 
written, in the late 1920's and published, I believe in 1930, 
by Felix Frankfurter, who became, of course, Justice Frankfurter. 
Nathan Green called the labor injunction, which described in 
rather graphic details, the tremendous abuses in the private 
sector, which had been imposed upon private employees and labor 
organizations by way of labor injunction. And the same type of 
abuse could easily occur in the public sector if judges who are 
not sympathetic to employees were allowed to issue ex-party, 
in some cases injunctive orders on a temporary basis and permanent 
injunctive orders where the grounds were perhaps suspect. 
If you resort first to the PERB, obviously there will 
be some delay involved, and there will be an increased caseload 
on the Public Employment Relations Board. On the other hand, 
if public employers are allowed to go directly into court, 
there is a risk of inconsistent Judicial Rules, since they will 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis in various courts; not only 
in the various districts, but among the various judges in each 
particular district. One judge might issue an injunction in 
a case where a fellow judge would not do so. If they are to be 
mitigating circumstances, which might provide a defense to an 
otherwise unlawful work stoppage, it perhaps becomes even more 
imperative to have the PERB initially make that determination, 
so that we will have a uniform state policy by the board posses-
sing the special expertise dealing with public sector labor matters. 
The other point that I want to make, is that if we 
decide that work stoppage should be illegal, we are going to have 
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ace the problem of penalty. Number 1: clearly outlawing 
lie sector strikes will not, in and of itself, preclude work 
es by public employees, it would be most naive to 
that that's going to be the resu The vast majority 
f states in this country have prohibited strikes by public 
1 es, and yet in every state that I am aware of, some work 
ages have occurred. In some cases, as we noted in the 
1 presentation here today, hundreds of strikes have 
occurred in many of those jurisdictions. 
It is not simply a question of whether we are going to 
successfully outlaw the strike, it is a question of what we will do, 
if we prohibit them, to provide at least the facade of a penalty. 
And I should point out, injunctive orders won't be successful, 
because if people feel agrieved sufficiently, they will disobey 
them. If they are disobeyed, they can fine a labor organization, 
if the fine becomes outrageous, the labor organization has the 
right to go into bankruptcy. So if worse comes to worse, they 
11 go bankrupt. The nicest thing the court can do, if it 
wants to assure the re-election of the union official, is to use 
jail as an alternative contempt penalty. Nothing helps gain 
re-election faster than sending the union official to jail who 
becomes a martyr. Needless to say, it is most difficult to 
negotiate with that union official while he or she is incar-
cerated. That was a problem a few years ago in New York, where 
they had a sanitation strike and the president was in jail, and 
finally the Mayor decided that it became necessary to negotiate 
and someone said are we going to let the president out of jail, 
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or are we going to go down and negotiate in the tombs. Contempt 
fines against ind iduals, are normally not terribly successful, 
s ly because if some people feel they need to be, the people 
are going to be judgment proof. Most lie employees, like 
private sector employees, don't have huge sums in their bank 
accounts, and if they are fined $1,000 a day, they rarely use 
their Mastercard or Visa to pay it. New York State, as has been 
mentioned, has a f e system; two days of pay for every day of a 
strike. Perhaps it has some deterrent effect, it has not been 
significant; there have been several hundred strikes in the State 
of New York by public employees. If people are agrieved enough, 
it is a small penalty to pay even 10 or 20 days worth of compen-
sation to the long-run benefits. And I should point out, what 
I hoped would be obvious, some people will say, well the worker 
only gained 20 cents per hour more, and over the next two year 
contract, that's insignificant. 
Two things have to be made clear: 1) they have enhanced 
their credibility in future negotiations, which is crucial. The 
next several times they get to the bargaining table and the employer 
assumes that there will be no work stoppage, it will reconsider that 
particular position; 2) the other factor is, that if you get a 20 
cent per hour wage now, it will be in the base of your pay for the 
next number of years, so that you have another 30 years to work, 
to the next 30 years you will have an increase base of 20 cents 
per hour, and on that basis it does, indeed, add up. 
The possible decertification of unions, as we see with 
the PATCO situation, is not terribly efficacious. If the 
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controllers ever went back to work or if their substitutes decide 
t they really do support Mr. Poli in his organization, the 
rnment is going to have to openly sit down and negotiate 
with them. Perhaps they will c e ir name so that the 
a stration can save face, but the truth of the matter is 
t people really support a particular o anization, and 
t right to negotiate through that organization, whether they 
are called PATCO or they are called some other organization, is 
semantical at the best. 
I would, at this point, editorialize very strongly 
a st something that is coming into vogue at the present time, 
automatic penalties. Some people are having automatic divisions 
for termination of strikers, automatic decertification of a 
striking union, and some people have even gone so far as to say 
they want a provision, providing, that no agreement, which is 
otiated as the result of a work stoppage shall be binding. 
I think such measures carry with them their own inherent weakness; 
once the person decides to go on strike, these automatic provisions 
are absolutely worthless. And not only are they worthless in 
terms of deterrents, there is a tremendous impediment to continue 
n otiations and any resolution of the dispute, because as with 
PATCO, no one is talking, the people have been terminated, the 
union has been decertified; and I too must say, not unlike the 
chair that when I fly I do perhaps say a few more prayers than 
I might have otherwise say when I fly. I am happy that unlike 
my colleague in UCLA, I was able to drive down here today rather 
than rely on the airlines. And I do pray, for the sake of all 
- 61 -
of us, that we don't have a situation where we have a single 
fatality in this country that could arguably be aLtributable to 
that labor dispute. 
Another issue that comes up to be alluded to briefly, 
is the damage issue, and this has to be a bifurcated question. 
One, should the public employer involved be allowed to obtain 
damages from the employees or the union engaged in a work stoppage 
that is unlawful. In a lower court case in this state, Pasadena 
Unified School District vs. Pasadena Teachers, in the citation of 
72 CALAP Third One Hundred the case of 1977. An appeal to the 
California Supreme Court was dismissed in an unreported citation. 
The Court of Appeals allowed the struck employer to sue the union 
for damages, on the grounds that the union impermissibly interfered 
with an implied convenant, in the individual contract of employment, 
that the public employees would not engage in work stoppage. And 
you might compare that decision with one in the State of Michigan, 
the Lampatre School vs. Lampatre Teachers, 252 Northwest Reporter 
Second, page 818, for the Michigan Supreme Court in 1977, provided 
that there was no tort damage remedy available where a public 
employer sues a union which engaged in unlawful strike. If a 
public employer were to have a damage right, I think it would be 
most inappropriate to ever allow a damage right against the 
individual employees engaged in the work stoppage. 
I feel that way for two particular reasons: 1) not al-
together clear in many cases whether the individual employee is 
going on strike voluntarily. Often they're caught up in the 
social pressure, there may have been a vote to go on strike, 
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may have personally voted against it but believe in the 
crat process, and they may have decided to honor tne wishes 
a m o ity of the brothers and sisters the bargaining 
it. So it might be unfair in a particular case to allow any 
awsu against the individual. 2) the unconscionable hardships 
ich would obviously result, if damages were available against 
individual striker, should be obvious, and that was recognized 
U.S. erne Court last term in a case where they ruled 
under 301, of the Labor Management Relations Act, where 
e is a breech of contract strike, whether or not it has been 
authorized or not by the representative labor organization, 
es are not available for individual employees to participate 
in the work stoppage. 
Another issue is the one that was raised in a question, 
ther third parties, injured by an unlawful work stoppage, 
should be entitled to damages from the striking union. I think 
this poses a problem. It is very difficult in many cases to 
measure such damages. There is no right in the private sector 
to obtain damages if a private transit company went on strike, 
if a private sanitation company went on strike; none of the 
eople injured by that work stoppage would be entitled to damages 
a st the striking workers or their union. The threat of 
damages of this nature would clearly be devastating if I were 
representing a labor union contemplating a work stoppage under 
such circumstances. I would make sure that their treasury was 
diminished to a minimum, and I would try and make sure that in 
no way would the employee have any liability, in which case, 
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f worse came to worse, tcy would a b avail e 
un so t to some ree e a 
a pract al one. 
t s ion 0 b rais 
lie 1 es engage an unlawful work 
e, is real aga st s ' e empl rs 
tance perhaps pr e cit zens, as opposed to the 
gove that would have to be esolved. Because, it 
p 
sn't clear in my mind that somebody strikes may be 
, to strike against the government, whether a 
ess that has been adversely affected by that, say 
during a transit strike for shoppers who are unable to get to 
the stores is effectively, whether they have the right to 
cla they have en injured in an inappropriate manner is some-
ing I have some doubts of respect to. 
c 
i 
t 
I s d also 1 to indicate, pretty much in con-
ion, if it were determined that some work stoppages, 
lie sector 
d be 
loyees should be 
iate to say that 
ohibited, I do th 
1 such work stoppages 
ld be iss le. I th there are clearly cases where 
st ages are provocated e her by unfair practices committ 
lie empl , perhaps at bargaining table where 
re e to bargain in good ith; they refuse to accord 
r s of the workers, the dignity and the respe 
the statute, or perhaps other grievances of a 
stantial and egregious nature, where it is very understandable 
pe le to recognize what it was that precipitated the work 
- 64 -
stoppage. I think that there should be, as was recognized in the 
ase of Holland School District vs. Education Association, the 
itation is 157 Northwest Reporter Second, Page 206, where the 
Mi an Supreme Court, 1968, did recognize, expressly, that 
if the provocation was extreme it would excuse or at least 
mitigate the behavior of the public employees. Even in the 
private sector the National Labor Relations Board, in a case 
lving the Coler Manufacturing Company, recognized that where 
employees engaged in a protected work stoppage, engaged in un-
protected conduct, or I should say really unprotected misconduct, 
ich might otherwise have barred them from getting reinstated. 
The labor board determined that, if their unprotected conduct 
had been precipitated by substantial misconduct on behalf of 
the employer involved, reinstatement would be appropriate to 
insure that the employer did not unfairly benefit from its own 
misconduct. And I do think, with respect to public sector 
strikes, it would be most unfortunate if we rewarded a public 
employer, who engaged in unlawful behavior, by permitting it 
to replace entirely employees who went out on strike in response 
to that behavior. Are there any questions that anybody would 
like to ask? 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Any questions from the panel? Dr. 
Craver, thank you very much. 
DR. CRAVER: Thank you very much, it's been a privilege 
appearing here today. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: We appreciate your testimony. Gary 
Mathiason, attorney, Littler, Medelsen, Fastiff and Tichy. 
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ffectively take over functions in this particular field which 
brings me to my third point, and the one where I will SJend 
st of my time this morning. 
And that is, with the Public Employment Relations 
Boa , as it now exists, but with the concept of a Public 
loyment Relations Board in the public sector, and the fact 
t as we see the decision of that board we see an agency which 
lieve has overstepped bounds and has made some decision 
h regard to carving out areas where they have found the 
conduct to be lawful, where in fact I don't believe there is 
statutory support for that or judicial support. 
Let me return to the first proposition in that I 
think it is a relatively simple one, and in listening closely 
to the speakers that preceded me this morning, I find no real 
substantiative difference with that proposition as to where 
the common law stood in terms of labor disputes, and generally 
that that is an evolution from statute, although they're 
certainly arguments to be made. The most current decision 
that covers this particular area is with the City of Gridley, 
IBEW vs. The City of Gridley, which was decided by the Third 
District Court of Appeals on June 30, 1981, and is now, I 
believe hearing has been granted to the California Supreme 
Court. There the court reaffirms what has been long standing 
law in the Court of Appeals in California, that there is no 
common law right to strike on the part of public employees; 
and makes reference to the San Diego decision by saying, 
basically that case does not apply here in that all administrative 
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very recently, Senator Rodda, who authored the legislation of the 
Rodda Act that we've come to know these days, made the ~ublic state-
ment that it met him with great surprise, as he read the San Diego 
decision, that there is even an assumption that in the passage of 
that legislation there was some implied authority to engage in 
strikes in the public sector. 
Moving from the legislative arena to the courts, the 
ifornia Supreme Court has voided commenting on this issue and 
really avoided commenting on the issue before the 1979 San Diego 
case. You first find in the case going back to 1968, Enray Berry, 
the court making what would normally be considered a wide judicial 
pronouncement in basically striking down an injunction, that it 
was unnecessary to get that question in that the injunction itself 
was unconstitutional on other grounds. Then we progressed to 1975, 
and a very well known case, in which our firm participated, the 
Cooper Decision, we find the court again avoiding the issue and 
saying we don't really need to determine whether strikes are 
illegal or not legal, we can even assume they're illegal, to 
reach the conclusions raised here. 1979 presented, in my opinion, 
a different circumstance, but only different in degree. Where 
we have the Supreme Court of California, looking as Professor 
Alleyne described it as a situation involving a school district, 
and looking at it from the standpoint of how do we deal with this 
circumstance in the contempt power being used by the court. In-
terestingly, in that decision, the court specifically states 
that there is a controversy. The court uses the word controversy 
with regard to the issue of legality or illegality and I think 
• 
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the use of that word has been very much 
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could it fashion a remedy to deal with the situation? And the f al 
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Employment Relations Board? 
the Pub ic 
Turning to that first issue, the court on Page 8 of its 
decision, explains, that re is under the, what is call 
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) an impasse edure. 
The procedure contemplates that the parties are obligated, both 
sides, to engage in a good faith use of those procedures. ally 
it would be a set of negotiations, following the set of negotia-
tions one party or the other would determ e additi al 
meetings would not be productive. They would then petition 
Public Employment Relations Board for a declaration of impasse, 
this is customarily granted by the Board after minimal investiga-
tion, normally by telephone, usually within 5 days. Following that, 
there is then the appointment of a state mediator. The mediator 
arranges for sessions with the parties, by statute 1s given 
minimum of 15 days to operate with the two sides, and interes-
tingly, then have the authority to determine that more than 15 
days is necessary. perhaps as long as 3 years. Although we 
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't had that experience. We have had in San Diego County 
districts where it's gone as long as one year before th~ media-
ens services released that authority and said we basically 
annot help you any further. After 15 days, one side or the 
ther may request the use of the factfinding procedures, and at 
discretion of the mediation service they may grant the 
sition of factfinding, which again is nonbinding result, 
would involve 3 parties. One basically chosen by the parties 
rom a list supplied by PERB, appointed by PERB, paid by PERB 
usually then a management member and an employee member of 
the panel. This is an impasse procedure, and quite frankly, 
well, it 1s imperfect. I offer to you that in working with 
about 10 percent of the district, Public School Districts in 
California, this procedure as rocky as it has been at times, 
has had surprisingly some very good results. That brings me 
back to the Supreme Court Decision. 
The Court decision goes on to state that, the impasse 
procedures almost certainly were included in the EERA for the 
purpose of heading off strikes, I couldn't agree more, there is 
no question but that type of procedure helps in that area. 
Ms. Bogue, who spoke to you at the outset of these proceedings, 
has done some work herself in her organization in terms of some 
statistical data and some investigation of public sector strikes. 
An interesting part of that is the tremendous number that 
occurred before the impasse process is utilized or exhausted. 
The overwhelming majority of them falling into that category at 
being very rare, that a labor dispute occurs after that particular 
I 
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procedure is exhausted. The court then goes on o state as in 
its first holding, since they assume deferment o a strike, 
referring there to the Legislature, at least until their com-
pletion, (the completion of the impasse procedure) strikes 
before then can properly be found to be a refusal to participate 
in the impasse procedures in good faith, and thus an unfair 
practice under Section 3543.6, Subdivision D. The cite 
they give for that is actually a treatise, which I authored 
with two colleagues in my office suggesting exactly that. That 
failure to participate in that process is an unfair labor prac-
tice (unfair practice under the Rodda Act) and accordingly, 
action could be taken by neutral government agency to at least 
ensure completion of that particular process, that being the 
impasse resolution process. Separate from that, the court then 
goes on to the question of whether the Public Employment Relations 
Board can fashion an adequate remedy and there we find many of 
the Sections that Professor Alleyne read, including the comment 
of the court that harsh automatic sanctions often do not prevent 
strikes and are counter productive. I can concur with that 
thought as well. But the fact that the Public Employment 
Relations Board might, in a particular circumstance, decide 
that an injunction is not appropriate or different type of 
penalty is not appropriate. I don't think that in any way, 1s 
an endorsement of the proposition that a strike in that circum-
stance would be lawful. It would be instead, a judgment on a 
case-by-case basis with the appropriate sanction or remedy is, 
to be imposed by the Public Employment Relations Board and sought 
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h courts, finally exclusive jurisdiction the court 
w e open the question, that once we have gone th 
e of ask the PERB to look at case and they've 
an answer, perhaps they decl ed h where 
we go ter that the court leaves open the question in 
coming back to the courts system and mov pass that 
TUCKER: Mr. Mathiason. 
MR. MATHIASON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Mr. Bald has a question. , 
MR. MATHIASON: Okay. 
MR. BALD: Can collective bargaining exist in the 
li sector, in your experience, with your employers, in the 
sence of the right to strike? Is it meaningful for the 
layers or for the employees? Was Professor Alleyne's testi-
that if they did not have the right to strike they might as 
11 not bother to bargain, right! 
MR. MATHIASON: Let me comment on that, cause I think 
t's a fundamental question to a piece of legislation that 
ontemplates collective bargaining. It is also, something that 
st of my work, the majority of the distil in the private sector 
our law firm heavily in the private sector, where you've 
a ost grown up with the collective bargaining spirit and grown 
th the, as I believe the wording you use, the strike being 
ef ctively the engine that makes the process work. I suggest 
close observation of the public sector, that the strike 
alone is not the only motivating factor to make the process of 
• 
• 
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collective bargaining work. "I think that the threat," and I 
use that really in quotes, other sanctions available for the 
public organization, besides merely the withholding of services, 
can generate incredible pressure on a public school employer, 
apart from a basic commitment to the concept of collective bar-
gaining, to come to the table and to effectively talk to the 
other side and talk meaningfully. The impasse procedure alone 
is very different in the public sector from the private sector . 
A school board, for example, makes a decision that it 
wants to take an action and in order to do that the law says 
you have to negotiate with your employee organization, that 
impasse procedure could block the public school employer from 
acting for well over a year. That's an incredible impediment 
and pressure that goes on the public body to sit down at the 
table and talk, political pressure on school boards. The 
answer to my question, I believe is yes, collective bargaining 
can work without the presence in every circumstance of a strike. 
MR. BALD: So could a carefully crafted law that per-
mitted, say the Public Employment Relations Board to prohibit 
strikes under certain circumstances, reduce the number of strikes 
without inhibiting the employee groups ability to bargain effec-
tively for their members? 
MR. MATHIASON: I would suggest to you that, perhaps 
even the current law we have interpreted in a particular fashion, 
which isn't too far from what the Public Employment Relations 
Board is doing, but different, could incourage a decrease in 
the number of labor disputes, number one. But, I offer number 
- 74 -
, that there is no law, no matter what the Legislature can do, 
is going to eliminate strikes. You don't eliminate crime. 
m not drawing an analogy, but laws saying this conduct is no 
anger permissible does not mean that that conduct will not take 
place. You have to accept that it will in certain circumstances 
take place and fashion the best legislation you can to allow the 
collective process to work. With as the court says, and I think, 
islative action prior to that have, said continuation of vital 
ervices and one of those services in the particular context 
're discussing now would be education. And I would offer 
ther as a private prospective and definitely not a prospec-
tive I would think shared by most of my clients, that in some 
circumstances, and I would like to get to that point, the accep-
tance of the strike by the public employer has occurred as a 
v icle of ultimately promoting the labor relations environment, 
as strange as that may sound, but very much on a case-by-case 
basis and with involvement of the employer, in that particular 
process. 
What I would offer as my observation, of the ~an Dieg~ 
decis~on, is that the court found it unnecessary again to reach 
the issue of legality of strikes. That it did defer to the 
Public Employment Relations Board as an unfair practice. The 
potential of the question of the employees refusing to parti-
cipate in the impasse process, by going on strike as an unfair 
practice, and ask the board to take original jurisdiction and 
fashion appropriate remedies to handle that particular circum-
stance. What I have seen happen; however, is something very 
I 
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much like Professor Alleyne described, and I th in good faith 
by the majority members of the Public Employment Relations Board 
and that is an interpretation of the San Diego decision, saying 
that under certain circumstances we the administrative agency 
have effectively the authority to find that this conduct is lawful. 
And I think that if you will look to the Fremont decision of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, which was issued on June 19, 
1980, its decision #136, you find a diccussion first by member 
Moore and then a concurring discussion by now Chairman Gluck, 
with regard to this very concept. And advancing a proportion 
that even before you go through the impasse process that under 
certain circumstances we would find that there is no, per se, 
illegal activity in engaging in a strike, and will look at the 
context in which it occurred; we will look at what we believe 
caused it to happen; and we will decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether, therefore, that the conduct is permissible or not per-
missible. 
Now let me share with you, separate from the academic 
discussion of what the case law means. What that has meant to 
my practice, in the field of labor law, as I have dealt with 
public school employers. We start working through the collective 
bargaining process. We attempt to negotiate, and I would offer 
to you the vast majority of the public school employers, do 
attempt to meaningfully reach an agreement with their consti-
tuency with their particular unit and the major motivation, 
surprisingly, are not avoidance of strike, they are: 1) that 
that's what our constituents want us to do, it's a politically 
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more acceptable thing; 2) it decreases the disharmony that might 
t rwise exist within the system, it's good for education. A 
er of positive factors going into it, suggesting they very 
much would like to get this decided, plus a feeling of pressure 
om the teachers in the community as constituents to reach this 
point. 
Separate from the strike vehicle, which is there and 
much a part of the reality of California labor relations, 
but I think only one of many of the factors and I'm not in most 
c cumstances definitely not the most important force that I see 
working on my clients to reach agreement, they go to the bargain-
ing table. Because we now have the Fremont decision, we have the 
Modesto decision, and we have a policy being taken by the Public 
Employment Relations Board, that it will look at the unique 
circumstances of every case, prior to the exhaustion of impasse, 
you almost certainly ret, as the labor relations situation heats 
up, an unfair practice charge filed against the employer. Why? 
Because should something happen, where the employees can't be 
controlled, something blows up at the last minute, a one-day 
work stoppage occurs, the argument is to be made by the employee 
group, that in fact this was promoted by the employer, that the 
employer acted in bad faith and inevitably we get a series of 
these charges and we get a type of behavior that is built in, 
almost to generate a record to establish this kind of bad faith 
activity. And no longer is there an acceptance, as I think was 
almost suggested by the Supreme Court in San Diego, that at least 
give the employer the opportunity to go through the impasse 
• 
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the public image and becomes a part of the dynamics of the whole 
process as we try very hard to reach agreement. 
A classic in this regard, is an unreported event, in-
volving a strike that took place with the Santa Clara County 
employees, a very bitter strike, unfortunately, was resolved. 
After the strike was over and through the use of the Publ 
Employment Relations Board, where an injunction was sought, 
there is then a very formal process that takes place with 
regard to a hearing on it, and the parties were prepared to 
eliminate any need for a hearing and wanted a very simple 
stipulation improved by the Public Employment Relations Bo 
wh h said, that since this strike took place before the impasse 
procedures were exhausted, it was, therefore, unlawful and was 
an unfair practice. The Public Employment Relations Board 
rejected that and accepted the proposition that you needed to 
show that there were circumstances here which suggested that 
t re were not unique actions by the employer ich could have 
triggered; therefore, a lawful strike prior to the exhaustion 
of the impasse procedure. 
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It's a limited message I have to give to you today, 
but I'm offering you as a practitioner, and someone whose in-
terested in avoiding strikes, that the use of the impasse 
procedure and making the procedure almost, per se, a requirement, 
a prerequisite, before the Public Employment Relations Board 
deeply goes into the question of the conduct of the parties with 
regard to legality or illegality of a strike, would be a very 
helpful look for me in eliminating unnecessary unfair labor 
practice charges, and in making that process work more effec-
tively. With all the pressures of collective bargaining still 
there and leaving somewhat open, and this is where I'm sure I 
can part with from my constituency, the question of what then 
happens after that impasse procedure has been exhausted, and 
the parties have gone through mediation, they have gone through 
factfinding, they have gone through post factfinding mediation, 
then what recourse is open. Can the public employer act uni-
laterally? What responses are available for the employees under 
those circumstances? It is at this stage that I think you have 
a much harder determination to make as to whether the Legislature 
should be involved, and make a clear determination on the 
options open to the public school employer or public employers 
at that point, versus the labor organization. 
In summarizing, what I am suggesting, by way of con-
clusions and actions that this committee might take, and ultimately 
the Legislature. I would suggest that: 1) strikes are reduced 
by the utilization of the whole impasse procedure. I would 
suggest; 2) that it be, per se, an unfair practice, to go on 
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up. What about a labor dispute of the potential of the strike? 
The response was fine, we'll replace them at that point and we'd 
like to stay as far away from the Public Employment Relations 
Board as we can. No problem, we aren't concerned about the str 
in that circumstance, we'll deal with that through replacements 
or with every other mechanism open to us. We don't want the 
involvement of the Public Employment Relations Board. 
I suggest to you, rather than the strike, before go 
through impasse, the use of the board in investigating that case 
and going into court with regard to a position of behavior ta 
by the employer, much more devastating to that employer. A pub-
lic school employer is a formidable adversary, at a bargaining 
if you are engaging in that kind of relation. Dealing as much as 
I do in the private sector versus the public sector, in a 
circumstance where a body has decided that it is going to take 
a position and hold to it, the powers available to the public 
employer are incredible, by comparison to what most private 
employers have at their disposal and can utilize. And I think 
in that regard we have seen the use of the strike vehicle being 
recognized more and more by organized labor in the public sector 
is not always to their best interest. And, in fact, some very 
unsuccessful strikes, in the public sector, have occurred in 
the past couple of years, which I think has encouraged reduc-
tion in the number. And I would offer beyond that at least 
utilization of the impasse procedures, becomes a tool available 
for the parties which should have the effect of reducing the 
number of strikes; and more than that has a real pressure on the 
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of their obligation of good faith bargaining, and as a prere-
quisite to even getting to the question of whether they can or 
cannot strike. Accordingly, a court, a Public Employment Rela-
tions Board, or the California Supreme Court can say we are not 
reaching the issue of whether a strike is lawful or not; but we 
are requiring that in each circumstance you go through the 
impasse procedures and utilize those first and relay on some 
statistical evidence that would suggest that when you do that 
you decrease the likelihood that there ultimately will be a 
strike. Then you're faced with the tough legislative decision, 
which I don't envy having to make, I know where the public is 
on the issue. And that is, once all of this is said and done, 
you then at that point allow a strike to take place lawfully 
or not and you have the traditional arguments with regard to 
services that cannot be interrupted. I think an example of that 
is the military service versus services that might in one con-
text be private, while one context be public, interruption 
may not nearly be as serious, with regard to the public as it 
otherwise would be. 
And then the whole question that I think was elegant 
just addressed just a few minutes ago, what sanctions do you 
impose. As a caveat to that I would add that I've spent a con-
siderable amount of time recently, in the State of New York, 
with public unions and employers and I would suggest under the 
Taylor Act the potential of the two for one fine seems to be 
treated with much greater respect than a court injunction, or 
the procedures available to us in California. I find great 
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that the views that I express here are inconsistent with those 
generally held by employee organizations. 
The topic that I would like to discuss, at the outset, 
has to do with the status of the law respecting public employee 
strikes at this time. I would like to give you my view as to 
what I think that that law is or is likely to become. I put 
it that way, because, if the courts do what I suspect that they 
will be doing in the course of the future years, they will say 
that that's the way it was in the past as well and they are 
only uncovering what the law really is and not creating a new 
law. The starting point for this analysis, has to be with 
recent California Supreme Court Decision in the San Di s 
Association case. In approaching that case, I am going to keep 
in mind what I think is a proper way to inquire into decisiona 
law, which is kind of a common law developed in our country. 
Looking not only at what the court has said in that case, but 
also what it has done. I hope that the academicians that I have 
testified here earlier will concur that this is frequently a 
useful way of evaluating decisions. There are many occasions 
when more can be discerned as to the meaning of a case by look-
ing at what; in fact, the court did, then perhaps, what they 
have said or what they have not said. 
The courts said, in the San Diego case, that PERB has 
exclusive initial jurisdiction, at least, to evaluate the 
question of illegality of the work stoppage that occurred there 
under the Rodda Act. The court held that the contempts 
adjudications, which have issued in the case, were invalid 
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If I am right, and if that is the limitation of 
authority of PERB, there is a very important consequence that 
follows. The law generally, with respect to employees stri s 
public employee strikes, I should say in California, has rus 
on court determinations going to matters having to do with 
public policy, and grounds that have never related to good 
faith negotiations. Let me put it a little bit more clearly 
so that you will not miss my point, Mr. Chairman. It is true 
that the District Courts of Appeal have generally held in 
California, at least prior to the enact~ent of the Rodda t 
that public employee strikes were illegal. Now there has been 
a number of grounds upon which those decisions have rust 
ranging, I suppose, from the old and what I would regard as 
anachronistic doctrine of sovereign unity to the fact that 
governmental services are essential to the notion that t 
government has a non-del able responsibility to determine t 
matters that lay in the area of collective bargaining and 
perhaps there are other grounds as well. But at no time, 
there been any suggestion, by any of the decisions, that 
lie employee strikes were illegal because of some impact of 
the obligation to negotiating in good faith, that is a creat 
of the Rodda Act. 
Now lets come back to the closing of the Supreme Court 
in the SanDi o case. The parties were told that a district, 
a school district in that particular circu~stance, has the 
obligation to go to PERB and for that reason, whatever the law 
might be in regard to public strikes generally, there can be no 
injunction is d 
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MR. BEESON: Are you referring to Section 923 being 
called inapplicable? 
MR. BALD: The concerted action rather says, that 
nothing in the act should be construed to give school employees 
those rights. 
MR. BEESON: Yes, and if I'm not mistaken, that's 
precisely what the Supreme Court said in San Diego. You will 
find that written into the decision, but that particular 
provision in Rodda, which makes inapplicable Section 923, does 
not have the meaning that strikes subject to, with respect to 
employer subject to the Rodda Act, are illegal. I think that's 
clear. 
Now the full range of the full impact of what I have 
said, as I have already indicated, is not to be found in the 
decision, but I think that that necessarily is going to be the 
way in which the law develops, because I see no escape from 
the logic. Now to some extent I think that that has already 
been borne out by what PERB has done in the more recent Fremont 
Case. PERB there looked upon conduct which, incidentally, was 
not a full-blown strike in the conventional sense, but rather 
two separate sick out days which were separated by a number of 
days and plus a policy of so-called working by the rule. That 
is, not performing any services of an extra cirricular nature, 
which has been the practice down through the years. In looking 
at those particular practices, which certainly I suppose could 
be regarded as work stoppages in the general sense, PERB found 
that they did not because of the circumstances of that case, 
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reflect any kind of bad faith approach to the meet and negotia-
ting obligation which the organization had, rather the board 
found that the sick out response was an effort to force t 
employer to abandon bad faith bargaining and try to come to 
some kind of resolution of the dispute. Accordingly, the charg s 
that those work stoppages constituted an unfair practice were 
dismissed. Now this holding of PERB in Fremont, has more 
recently been sustained by the District Court of Appeal for 
the first Appellate District, in a decision which is dated 
November 30th of this year, that's just a very recent decision 
in a matter of a week or so ago that it came. This, I think 
lends further emphasis to the propriety of holding that there 
will be an area of legal strikes, at least under the Rodda Act, 
which will be recognized by decision law as the time goes on. 
I would like to make a small detour in what I am 
going to say next to refer to a statement by Mr. Mathiason, 
I believe this really was one of the most important points 
that Mr. Mathiason wanted to get across in his remarks to the 
Committee. I refer to Mr. Mathiason's assistance that there 
be a recognition of the impasse procedures, before an exhausting 
of those procedures, before any strike can take place. That 
suggestion, at this time, is contrary to current law. In 
Frem~n!, the two stoppages occurred during the course of the 
impasse procedures. The first stoppage occurred, I think, the 
day after the first impasse session took place and the second 
stoppage occurred several days later, but before the impasse 
procedures had been completed. The holding as I've indicated, 
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The theory and practice of collective bargaining, as 
it has evolved in the private sector, pre-supposes some k o 
balance or equation the power of the parties who came t 
table. The employers power is obvious because it controls 
makes decisions on what the terms and conditions of employment 
shall be. Employees power is e her meaningless or much more 
difficult to exercise unless there is some sort of economic 
weapon that they can bring to bare. The economic weapon, of 
course, traditionally has been the strike. This means, 
essence, that collective bargaining as it has been developed 
and practiced down through the years, means necessarily that 
there is the employers ability and power to make decisions 
and put them into effect on one side and the employees r 
to withhold their services on the other side of the equation. 
The notion has very respectable credentials. I could refer 
you to any number of scholarly works, where this point has be 
made; but I would like particularly to state that the United 
States Supreme Court has made the point in a decision, in 1957 
which is not too frequently cited these days, namely National 
Labor Relations Board vs. Lyon Oil Campa~. That's a decjsion 
in 1957 which was cited at 352 of the State's report, page 282. 
The question there was whether a union which had in effect 
reopened a contract pursuant to a reopening clause could stri 
in the face of what appeared to be somewhat ambiguous language, 
in Section 8-D of the National Labor Relations Act, that 
seemingly required the union to keep in effect, the terms and 
conditions that were in a contract without striking until 
determination e of the contract. Keep 
mentioned that the strike re occurr 
contract, suant to a re en cl 
argument was made ace ted Sup erne 
there is to be collective b a 
contract, t r to stri must ace 
bargaining, otherwise ther 
the sense that the law cent 
won t be collect 
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may, just one sentence from erne Court s 
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we wouldn't need any laws relating to collective barga 
The laws are written primarily, I suppose, to assure 
happens and give some legal sanction behind that assuranc 
circumstances where employers or perhaps 1 or organiz 
are reluctant to behave in the way in which the law 
practice of collective barga ing contemplates. So we ar 
dealing with problem areas looking at the decis s 
this area and by look at what the law is, we are not c 
pelled so much to worry about what may happen non-
areas. I would suggest that in the problem areas, re 
employee organization is faced with a school district or 
another public employer which is reluctant to underst 
practice good faith negotiations, that there is ve 1 tt 
the long run which can be done by the employee organiz ti 
through other mechanisms; publicity demonstrations, t 
of that kind; that will be meaningfully as far as 
1s concerned. The ultimate weapon must be the right to 
their services. 
It is, of course, ironic that the pol t 
country promoting collective bargaining, has as its ob 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and yet has as one o 1 
indispensable elements, the right to strike and they occa 
use the right to strike. That's built into the tens 
collective bargaining has been practiced and there are t o 
c1ans who can explain far better than I can, why it wor 
it is enough as far as this Committee should be concern 
think, to know and understand that it has worked. That it 
- 94 -
been accepted on a very broad basis as a policy under which 
labor relations have been conducted in this country both in the 
public sector and the private sector, and that the continued 
acceptance of an understanding that that tension must exist, 
will do a great deal to make the whole collective bargaining 
theory operate on a successful basis. 
One of the questions that was asked, I believe, of 
the first witness who testified here today, was whether the 
holding in San Diego, and perhaps implications which I have 
alluded to in that decision, would be applicable beyond the 
Rodda Act itself. I can only speculate on that, but I think 
it's worthy of consideration. The Higher Education Employment 
Relations Act, and the State Employer Relations Act, which are 
also subject to the jurisdiction of the administration of PERB, 
have similar but not identical provisions dealing with the 
bargaining process. In the Rodda Act, the phrase is used "the 
obligation to meet and negotiate in good faith." In the other 
two acts you will find the phrase, ''meet and confer in good 
faith,'' which is a similar phraseology to that which exists 
in Meyers-Milias-Brown. So we do have a variety of legal re-
gulations applicable to various parts of the public sector and 
we do have some differences in language. I think, however, 
in the practical application many distinctions which may exist 
between meeting and conferring in good faith, meeting and 
negotiating in good faith, are so technical and overly refined 
as to probably be meaningless. If the negotiation process 
or across the table discussions which are contemplated as a 
• 
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way of resolving disputes in the public sector, is to have 
meaning, I should think that the general principles which I 
have discussed would be applicable in all of these pieces 
legislation. Ultimately if the matter is permitted to evolv 
through decisional law, rather than through legislative law, 
that what has happened in the Rodda Act should and will occur 
with respect to the other pieces of legislation as well. 
I would like to make just one or two comments on 
happens in connection with strike situations as I have obse 
them in public sector as well as the private sector that may h 
some meaning in the connection with deliberations of the comm 
It is a common place to talk about the employee organizati 
engaging in a strike as though the organization itself was a 
single entity with a single leader, and a single voice and 
without taking into consideration the fact that his 1s a demo-
cratic organization. I think that's a problem that has to 
in that fact of life, recognized in trying to make some kind 
sense out of what happened in connection with strikes. I su 
that school districts who have encountered strikes, at least 
this is my experience, like to point the finger at a particular 
leader or a particular group of leaders, and say this is t 1 
responsibility, and this is what they have done, and the em-
ployees who are involved in this thing have bad leadersh 
That ordinarily is not the case. The fact is quite the oppos t 
In more strikes than not, and I am coming very close to home to 
a many number of situations of which I have been involved in; 
the leadership of an employee organization facing impasse 
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bargaining, not knowing what to do, spends an inordinate amount 
and trouble t ing to avoid the strike; trying to find some s 
tion by which will be ace table to their constituency so t 
strike will not have to take place. More often than not, 
you will find that the pressure for a strike wells up om 
constituent body itself rather than being a reflection of the 
ideas and predispositions of the leadership. This is a con 
quence, and I'm not making any judgments of any kind on a mo 
or ethical basis, but it's a consequence of the way in 1 
labor organizations operate on a democratic basis. There is 
nothing more familiar to me than to attend a membership meet 
at which time a large group of people will attend, whereas, 
with respect to lesser matters on the agenda, you may e dif-
ficulty getting very many people to attend the meetings. A 1 
group of members will attend to discuss the question of stri 
and inflammatory speeches will be made from the floor, emotiona 
outbreaks will take place about what a terrible situation bar 
gaining has gotten itself into, and how bad the employers are. 
The determination to strike is the consequence of that kind of 
broad scale voice of the members rather than being an res 1 
of what the leadership would like to see. I don't make any con 
elusions, I don't draw any conclusions necessarily from 
have said, but it is a point which I would like to have con de 
because the problems of strikes, I think, is a problem mostly 
with respect to the membership and not with respect to the e e 
It has been said earlier, during the course of thi 
session, that strikes can be devastating to labor organizat s 
• 
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and this is true, strikes can be devastating to employers as 
well, and that has occasionally occurred. That is not, 
why strikes are permitted, either in the private sector not 
why they should be permitted in the public sector; rather it 
the function of the str to be able to keep the employer g 
off guard enough in a question of bargaining, so that there s 
always the lack of certainty as to what will happen that 1 
promote settlement. When the strike does, in fact occur, the 
experience, I think, will show (and I haven't tried to term 
whether or not the materials that were introduced on the basis 
of which the area of testimony was given) that once the stri 
has occurred in a particular bargaining relationship, it's ve 
unlikely that there will be a recurrence of that strike in th 
same bargaining relationship immediately thereafter in the 
following contract. Ordinarily, if a strike takes place both 
sides will have learned enough from it and dislike it enough 
so that neither will want to have the experience repeated. 
That is part of this sort of inherent inconsistance in the 
collective bargaining process, where we have to invite strikes 
in the sense and make strikes available as part and parcel of 
the long range objective of being able to avoid strikes and 
being able to resolve matters on a peaceful basis. Mr. Chairm 
I think that that concludes what I wanted to say this morn 
if there are any questions I would be happy to deal with them. 
CHAIRMAN TUCKER: Mr. Beeson, thank you very much for 
your testimony. Chuck Cole, Executive Director of the Public 
Employees Relations Board. come on up, Chuck. 
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MR. CHUCK COLE: Chairman Tucker, members of the 
Committee and staff, thank you very much for the opportuni 
to join you today and share my thoughts on the important issue 
of the legality of the right to strike for public employees 
California. My comments today will principly be direct 
towards answering that question as it relates to the 
Educational Employment Relations Act. 
As you know, I'm the Executive Director of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, which has jurisdiction now over the 
Educational Employment Relations Act, State Employer-Employee 
Relations Act, and Higher Education Employer-Employee Relation 
Act. I would initially like to begin by sharing with you the 
thought that the impasse provisions, as you have heard so 
eloquently described earlier today, of mediation and fact-find 
are remarkably successful, and I think that's important to note 
some statistics that reflect that success. 
There are approximately 2,000 units in place, in 
California School Districts. In 5 years that represents approxi 
mately 10,000 negotiation rounds in which the parties have s 
to reach an accord on an interest dispute or an interest matter. 
We've had approximately 1,800 mediations occur. We've had out 
180 fact-findings occur, and those have largely resulted in 
settlements of those differences and have resulted in contractua 
agreements. I think that's a credit to the parties, to the 
Legislature and the Governor for enacting the statute, to the 
mediators involved in the field, and the fact-finders in the 
effort to assist the parties in raching settlements of their disputes. 
• 
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As you heard this morning from Bonnie Bogue, there 
certainly have been some interest strikes that which have 
occurred. I think that since the passage of the Rodda Act, 
it's very unlikely that we will see, we certainly haven't 
since its passage, and it's unlikely we will ever see recog-
nition strikes, or rights disputes strikes occur. A careful 
analysis of the strikes which have occurred, will show that 
many of them occurred without the completion of the statutory 
impasse proceedings. Additionally, some of them occurred with 
an exclusive representative in place under the Rodda Act 
therefore, were outside of the EERA when they occurred. I 
would now like to turn my attention to the case that is so 
often cited, the San Di o Teachers Association vs. the erior 
Court of San Diego County in 1979 decision. For the sake of 
brevity, Professor Alleyne had recited the facts earlier this 
morning, and I won't take the time to do that. But suffice it 
to say that again, the association sued the Superior Court t 
set aside the contempt citation that was granted by the cour 
Thereby, arguing among other things, that the advent of the 
EERA implyingly granted a right to strike. At that point the 
Public Employment Relations Board was not involved with t 
court case. The Superior Court ruling was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal, and the matter was appealed to the State 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then asked the Public Employm nt 
Relations Board to respond to several questions. The agency 
advised the court that it could not give a definitive response 
to the questions in the matter without actually having a case 
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before it, but it would make an effort to speculate in response 
to the courts questions. The court asked if a strike might con-
stitute an unfair practice, and the PERB majority said yes, and 
listed two examples: 1) A strike without completion of the 
statutory impasse proceedings; 2) A strike to achieve demands 
without negotiating for those demands. The court also asked if 
PERB had the authority to seek injunctive relief in strike cases, 
and the PERB majority again responded that EERA provided that 
PERB would have exclusive initial jurisdiction over determina-
tions of unfair practice charges. Therefore, to the extent 
that a party alleges that a strike constitutes an unfair 
practice, the matter might be enjoinable and should come to 
PERB first, although PERB's decision then would ultimately be 
appealable to the courts. 
It should be noted that the above responses made to 
the court, were made by a majority of the board. In a separate 
dissenting Amicus filing, one board member argued that strikes 
violated the common law and are; therefore, per se, unlawful. 
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the latter argument, 
and did not answer the question of whether strikes are, per se, 
unlawful under the common law. The individual member also 
argued that the reference to Labor Code Section 923 made in the 
EERA, would also make strikes unlawful under the Act. The 
court specifically rejected that argument, holding that the 
EERA provisions, merely did not extend the school employees 
those specific rights granted to private sector employees 
by Section 923 of the Labor Code. 
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The court further advised, that PERB should not grant 
injunctions, or sanctions, automatically, which should use its 
expertise to further the purposes of the act. The court con-
cluded that strikes which were unfair practices were enjoinable, 
and also ruled that PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction over 
what constitutes an unfair practice. The court vacated the con-
tempt citation, and indicated that when an injunction is sought, 
the request should initially be made of PERB and not the courts. 
The majority of response to the Supreme Court's questions, never 
addressed the common law status or legality of strikes questioned. 
The majority contended that PERB had no jurisdiction to interpret 
the common law and that is still the agencies belief. 
It should be noted that the board has not yet had the 
opportunity to decide the question of whether a strike is illegal 
under the EERA, or all statutory requirements have been met by an 
employer organization. The Supreme Court left open the question 
of whether a strike which doesn't violate EERA, might still con-
stitute an unlawful act under the common law. As a result of 
the San Di o case, the board adopted rules which provide for a 
very compressed investigative time line in which the board's 
general council reports to the board within 48 hours after 
receipt of a request in recognition of the nature of the rights 
and interest which are involved. A board decision to seek in-
junctive relief related to a specific unfair practice charge, 
is based on an evaluation of two things: 1) The likelihood that 
the charge would prevail when heard; and, 2) The potential for 
irreparable harm should the injunctive relief not be sought. 
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ess, so for that purpose I'd like to submit that 
also, we have submitted to th£ Committee a 
on e issue of public employees strikes and 
fully being entered into the record also. 
TUCKER: Thank you very much. Anybody else 
wants to esti 
to 1 ee to do 
come up and say a few words. I want you 
at this time. Come on up, you've got a 
s more. Nobody. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want 
to you for coming this morning; we have really enjoyed it, 
it's been tional for all members of the Committee. Hope to 
see soon Sacramento. We're adjourned. 
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Public Employees Right to Strike 
Page Three 
In addition to the references made at today's heari~gs interested 
persons may wish to review the "Final Report of the Assembly Advisory 
Council on Public Employee Relations" (March 15, 1973) and "Strikes 
by Public Employees: The Consequences of Legislative Inattention'' 
by Laura V. Best, 20 Santa Clara Law Review 945 (1980). 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William D. Heekin, Jr. 
Executive Director, CIPEC 
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The fluctuations, of course, depend on the length of strikes and number of employees 
involved. In J 980, the largest strike in manday terms was a 6-day walkout that idled 5,600 
people, producing 33,600 lost employee days (City of Los Angeles). However, 1979 had three 
strikes, each of which exceeded the 100,000 manday mark: 163,400 in the San Francisco Unified 
School District's 43-day strike, 151,800 in the Southern California Rapid Transit District's 23-
day strike, and 136,950 in BART's 83-day lockout/strike. (SCRTD's two all-time records for a 
single agency still have not been approximated - 265,200 mandays in 1974 and 240,500 in 
1976.) 
Although the 122 strikes experienced in California's public sector in 1979 and 1980 
represent an increase of 40 per cent over the 87 strikes in the 1977-78 period, the number of 
mandays lost in 1979 and 1980 increased by 115 per cent, which is perhaps a better measure of 
the impact of these strikes on employees and on the delivery of services. The number of indi-
vidual employees who participated in a strike or sickout (or lockout) in 1979-80 increased by 67 
per cent over the 1977-78 period to a new high of 59,121 workers. 
1 See discussion of the basic law on public sector strikes in California in CPER No. 18, pp. 2-17. Subse-
quent litigation has affected the rights of employees engaged in strikes and the validity of strike settlement agree-
ments, but has not altered the basic holdings of the cases noted in this earlier discussion. 
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number enforcement functions in some fire depart-
were fearful of a rash of local regulations which 
of their own 
the divided 
from joining unions not composed entirely 
affiliated with internationals which might raise 
• union interests) issue discussed in Perez. 
introduced to extend Section 923 to public employees: 
1729 was no action on any of the bills, all of 
or police organizations. 
It seems apparent at this point that if public safety employees could be prohibited 
from joining unions that they certainly didn 1t have any right to strike. With 
apologies to Charles Scully because he heard this quote at so many committee hear-
ings in the s it here to at least quote in part Labor's 
greatest defender 
"Particularly, want to my conviction that militant tactics 
have no place in the functions of any organization of Government em-
ployes. in the Federal service rests the obligation to 
serve the • whose interests and welfare require orderliness 
and conduct of Government activities. This obligation 
is Since their own services have to do with the functioning 
of the Government, a strike of public employes manifests nothing less 
than an intent on their to prevent or obstruct the operations of 
Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking to-
ward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to suppo~t 
it, is unthinkable and intolerable." (Franklin D. Roosevelt) 
In 1959 Assemblymen McMillan and George Brown authored AB 602 which would have 
added Section 923.5 to the Labor Code to extend Section 923 to all local govern-
ment entities when organizations of "non-uniformed employees". The 
bill was amended to strike out "organizations of non-uniformed employees" and to 
insert 11with ions of employees other than policemen or deputy sheriffs; 
subject to the constitution and the laws of the state and the provisions contained 
in the charter and ordinances and regulations of cities, counties and 
political subdivisions. While approved by the policy committee, the bill died on 
the Assembly file. It is clear that the Legislature was reluctant even to permit 
certain safety to join labor organizations and engage in collective bar-
gaining. • the militant tactics involved in a strike did not have to be 
addressed. there were strikes in California and elsewhere even in 
those were deemed unlawful by the public and the courts. 
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McMillan's AB 618 was approved adding 
authorizing firefighters to join any bona 
of their choice but expressly prohibiting strikes by 
and also 
extend Section 923 of 
for the first time indicating that the enactment did not 
Labor Code to public agencies or their employees. 
Prior to the 
the 
618 the League Board of Direcl"rs in recognition 
---t-o organize and the fact that 70/~ of public em-
10 000 population were already organized with-
which would make it unlawful for the state or 
obstruct the right of firefighters to join bona 
ions of their own choice. Even with League opposition with-
drawn the bill was refused passage the Senate the first time it was brought 
up for action. 
dates (1959) and the Los Angeles Transit decision (1960) 
the as enacted included both an express strike 
prohibition and a statement that Section 923 could not be interpreted to apply 
to public employees. The latter section is the heart of private industry employee 
organizational and co bargaining rights. It also guarantees the freedom 
of private sector to engage in concerted activities (strikes) for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The several 
guarantees of Section include the right to a) associate and organize, b) to 
designate employee representatives, c) to negotiate terms and conditions of em-
ployment, d) to be free from intimidation or coercion, and e) to engage in concerted 
(strike or other) activities for the purpose of collective bargaining. The fire-
fighter sponsors of AB 618, as introduced, sought the first (association and 
organizaton) right directly and expressly and the four others by implication. When 
AB 618 was first amended on March 23, 1959, the firefighters also expressly sought 
the right "to collectively through representatives of their own choosing 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Only 
the right to strike was denied them. The second amendment when the bill was still 
in the house of origin amounted to a complete revision reading substantially as 
enacted. When so revised Section 923 was expressly made inapplicable. The only 
Senate amendment also prohibited picketing. Eighteen months later in 1960 in the 
Los Angeles Transit case, the California Supreme Court made it clear to all of us 
that absent authorization by the Legislature strikes by public .;mp Loyees were un-
lawful and that Section 923-type rights to engage in concerted activities include 
legislative authorization to strike. 
To go back to the post World War II period, it must also be remembered that 
private transit systems for a variety of reasons were being taken over by public 
agencies. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and other unions had represented 
private transit employees in all of their collective bargaining negotiations with 
private transit owners. We recognized that there had been long established labor-
management relationships and in all of the legislative acts authorizing local public 
entities to operate public transit systems or creating transit authorities you will 
find provisions dealing with employer-employee relations \vhich include language 
similar to Section 923 of the Labor Code. The League did not oppose any of these 
provisions where a public transit district was replacing a private transit operation. 
The League recognized the distinction between public transit employees who had been 
private transit and all other public employees. The first time this issue 
I 
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came before the court was in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. The 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 54 C. 2d 684 (October 1960), where it was con-
were without the legal right to strike because they were 
entity. The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Act included following language: 
shall have self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor , to bargain collectively 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection •..• Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this act .•• the authority ••. shall enter 
into a written contract with the accredited representatives of 
[its] employees governing wages, salaries, hours and working 
conditions •••. " (Underlining 
The is identical to the of Section 923. Before the court con-
sidered the quoted language, Chief Justice Gibson speaking for a majority of the 
court said: 
"In the absence of legislative authorization, public employees 
in general do not have the right to strike (see 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 
1159-1161), and the questions presented here are whether the act 
creating the transit authority gave its employees such a right and, 
whether the statute is constitutional as applied to the em-
represented by the brotherhood." (Emphasis added) 
The court held that the right to engage "in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" constituted 
authorization for the public transit employees to strike and compared that 
language to similar wording found in federal statutes and uniformly interpreted as 
including the right to strike. The two dissenting justices did not want to go as 
far as the court majority and imply a legislative grant of such a right to strike 
the It therefore was the unanimous view of the California 
Court in 1960 that in the absence of legislative authorization there was 
to strike. To say that the issue is an open one in the Supreme Court ig~ores 
this legislative and decisional history and, in effect, says that policemen who 
can be prohibited from joining non-police unions nevertheless may strike but fire-
fighters cannot. 
the dates of the enactment of Labor Code Sections 1960-1963 and the 
of the Supreme Court's decision in the Los Angeles Transit Authority case, it is 
clear in out of a super abundance of caution the Legislature included both 
express strike prohibition with respect to firefighters and non-applicability of 
Section 923. After the Supreme Court's decision in October of 1960 when it said 
the absence of legislative authorization public employees in general do not have 
the to strike," it no was necessary to include an express strike pro-
hibition. It was totally adequate in all subsequent legislation to simply indicate 
of Section 923 both with respect to collective bargaining general 
activities 
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To summarize, public employee strikes always have been unlawful in California 
except when authorized by the Legislature. Prior to the Los Angeles Transit 
case and out of a super abundance of caution Sections 1960-1963 authorizing 
firefighter association and organization activities expressly prohibited strikes 
and also made Section 923 inapplicable to public employees. After Los Angeles 
Transit in 1960 it no longer was necessary for the Legislature in public sector 
relations acts to do more than provide for inapplicability of Section 923. 
Decisional law was clear and the Legislature relied on it. 
With all your experts you should have a full discussion of the many District 
Court of Appeal decisions which have held that strikes by public employees are 
lawful. Hearings by the Supreme Court after such decisions generally have been 
denied. The fact that there have been many strikes by public employees in no 
way makes such strikes lawful. There are many drunk drivers but no one would 
suggest that we make drunk driving lawful. If the Supreme Court wants to 
late validity of strikes (San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court, 24 C. ) 
then the Supreme Court will be responsible for changing long established 
policy. It appears to me that the Legislature would not enact legislation 
as a matter of public policy that strikes by public employees are 
Si~ely, 
, . . I J !;;L-.x <-c{, 
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